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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis analyses the nature and significance of US strategy towards Eastern 
Europe between 1945 and the 1956 Hungarian revolution. Tension between the 
ideological goal of liberating the USSR’s satellite regimes and geopolitical considerations 
restrained American policy, perpetuating a fluctuation between containment and 
liberation.  
America embarked on a liberation policy under Harry Truman and strategists such 
as George Kennan, Charles Bohlen and Paul Nitze. Adopting salient strategic reviews 
like NSC 20/4 and NSC 68, policy oscillated between containment and liberation in 
response to external developments like Jozip Tito’s defection, the Soviet nuclear bomb, 
the rise of Mao Ze Dong and the Korean War.  
Proponents of political-psychological warfare during Dwight Eisenhower’s 
administration like John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner and C. D. Jackson 
struggled to resolve the tension between ideology and geopolitics ultimately paralysing 
the US ability to roll back communism. Joseph Stalin’s death, the East German uprising 
and the Hungarian revolution illustrated Washington’s impotence. 
History fallaciously demarcates the death of liberation post-Hungary. Although 
Washington rejected its existing strategy, the long-term goal was not relinquished. 
Eastern European policy adapted to geopolitical limitations, through coexistence and 
liberalisation. Liberation shifted to the Developing World under the slogan ‘nation-
building.’ 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
Introduction                                                                        1-4 
 
Notes                             5                               
 
 
Chapter 1 • Confronting the Kremlin • The Truman Administration and Post-War  
 
Eastern European Strategy                6-24 
 
Notes               25-26 
 
 
Chapter 2 • New Threats and Old Theories • The Dilemma of Liberation for the  
 
Democrats, 1950-1953               27-43 
 
Notes               44-45 
 
 
Chapter 3 • Assuming the Mantle • The Eisenhower Administration and Eastern  
 
Europe, 1953-1956               46-65 
 
Notes               66-69 
 
 
Chapter 4 • Year of Upheaval • 1956: Contradiction, Impotence and Revolution   70-89 
 
Notes                 90-91 
 
 
Conclusion • The Impact and Significance of the Hungarian Revolution on US Strategy 
and the Historical Record               92-95 
 
Bibliography             96-102      
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency 
CIG, Central Intelligence Group 
Cominform, Communist Information Bureau 
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence 
EDC, European Defence Community 
ERP, European Recovery Program 
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany 
GDR, German Democratic Republic 
ICBM, Inter-continental ballistic missile 
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
MIT, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NCFE, National Committee for a Free Europe 
NSC, National Security Council 
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board 
OPC, Office of Policy Coordination 
OSP, Office of Special Projects 
PPS, Policy Planning Staff 
PSB, Psychological Strategy Board 
PUSD, Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department (British) 
RFE, Radio Free Europe 
RIAS, Radio in the American Sector 
RL, Radio Liberation (renamed Radio Liberty) 
SIS, Secret Intelligence Service (British) 
SPG, Special Procedures Group 
USIA, United States Information Agency 
VFC, Volunteer Freedom Corps 
VOA, Voice of America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The decade following the cataclysmic Second World War has widely been 
recognised as a salient period of historical development. Its significance stems from the 
dramatic shift of geopolitical influence from old power bases to new that occurred on a 
global scale following the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945. Historical attention has 
naturally emphasised the new centres of power that emerged in the post-war world, the 
United States and Soviet Union, because these two nations and relations between them 
represented the most influential forces shaping the character of the modern world. 
The international conduct of nations is not solely governed by geopolitical 
considerations of military security and political and economic influence. The presence of 
ideology in the course of foreign affairs is as universal and timeless as that of geopolitics. 
The beliefs and aspirations of nation states and cultures have always had as integral a part 
in influencing international behaviour as the tangible, practical factors that limit or 
motivate actions. Ideology and geopolitics are inseparable strains that constitute the 
composition of foreign policy, but the dynamic between them is not necessarily 
complementary. The tension between ideological aspirations reflecting a nation’s ideas, 
values and beliefs and the geopolitical interests that comprise its strategic and security 
interests in economic, political and military power have often created difficulties in the 
running of foreign affairs. It is common for one element to either restrict the other or 
demand of it a contradictory objective.  
 American foreign policy has been no exception, combining geopolitical 
considerations with a significant ideological strain. The United States has traditionally 
been motivated in its international conduct by its economic and security needs, and also 
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the preservation of its political and economic principles at home and their projection 
abroad where possible. Accordingly, when America entered the Second World War 
President Franklin Roosevelt stipulated not only wartime military objectives but also 
post-war political goals in the Atlantic Charter of 1941. Based on the American principle 
of representative government and free elections, Roosevelt established that the “right of 
all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live”1 would become 
a primary political objective during the post-war reconstruction of Europe. The Yalta 
“Declaration of Liberated Europe” marked Roosevelt’s efforts to forge a consensus 
among his wartime British and Russian allies that the American political vision for post-
war Europe based on the Atlantic Charter principle of democracy would later be 
implemented.  
However, the efforts of Roosevelt and then Truman to implement the Atlantic 
Charter and “Declaration of Liberated Europe” were complicated by restrictive 
geopolitical factors. During 1945 it became increasingly clear that the principles at the 
heart of US policy were at odds both with British and more seriously Russian plans. The 
application of the Declaration therefore represented the first test of the ability of the 
peacetime Truman administration to overcome restrictive practical factors in favour of its 
ideologically-rooted political agenda, not only for Europe but a new global order. Such a 
system would replace the former international order based on spheres of influence and 
power politics. Yet the new system based on international cooperation with a collective 
security organisation at its heart would require Soviet consent if it was to be successfully 
applied to Eastern Europe.  
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This study examines the ensuing conflict that evolved out of the fundamental 
ideological and geopolitical differences between the US and USSR from the perspective 
of American policy-makers. It aims to illustrate that Eastern Europe became an arena of 
primary significance in highlighting the antagonisms between the US and USSR as both 
sides disputed the primacy of their interests and projected their divergent values onto the 
region in the post-war era. Furthermore, the Eastern European theatre revealed the 
tensions within American foreign policy between its geopolitical power and ideological 
ambitions. This tension created antagonistic forces with which foreign policy had to cope 
and adapt under the shadow of increasingly powerful modern weaponry.  
Historical analysis of the topic has grown in recent years, providing much needed 
modification to traditional accounts of America’s role in the evolution of the Cold War.2 
However, more recent studies have tended to emphasis either the geopolitical or the 
ideological factors that shaped the America’s covert offensive against the Soviet bloc, 
thereby separating the philosophy of ‘containment’ from that of ‘liberation.’ This has 
involved a false dissociation in the historical analysis reducing one element in favour of 
the other. In fact the complex inter-relationship between ideology and geopolitics 
persistently influenced the course of US policy between 1946 and 1956 in the Soviet 
satellites. Despite inferior geopolitical influence, the post-war administrations of 
Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower waged an ideological and political 
warfare campaign against the Soviet Union shifting between containment and liberation 
objectives as it was affected by internal and external factors. The Hungarian revolution of 
late 1956 represents a symbolic culmination of this challenge to Soviet primacy in the 
region. The impact and significance of the revolution upon Washington’s foreign policy 
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bureaucracy, its outlook and operations, and not the internal events themselves, constitute 
the primary focus of this study. 
Chapter 1 of the thesis discusses the genesis of the conflict over Eastern Europe 
with the evolution of the Truman administration’s policy from a peacetime to a Cold War 
basis and the subsequent emergence of tensions in strategic thinking between ideology 
and geopolitics. Chapter 2 examines the shifting nuances of policy in the final three years 
of Democratic office as developing external geopolitical factors affected the foundations 
of US strategy. Chapter 3 studies the Republican assumption of the struggle, with the 
Eisenhower administration’s renewed commitment to the region and the oscillation of 
policy between containment and liberation between 1953 and 1956. Finally, Chapter 4 
incorporates the events of 1956 as they led up to the Hungarian revolution, analysing the 
symbolic terminal point of America’s efforts to liberate the region. The conclusion draws 
on the significance of US efforts and objectives during the post-war decade and assesses 
the historical record that has come to define the Hungarian revolution as the final 
vanquisher of liberation. 
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1 
CONFRONTING THE KREMLIN 
The Truman Administration and Post-War Eastern 
European Strategy 
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War America’s ideological 
objective of establishing a global political system based on representative government 
and free elections was constrained by geopolitical factors. At Yalta in February 1945 
President Roosevelt had hoped to secure the agreement of Marshall Stalin and Prime 
Minister Churchill to apply the US political programme based on the Atlantic Charter 
and enshrined in the “Declaration of Liberated Europe.” When he returned to the US 
Roosevelt proudly announced the Declaration, framing its formulation in an 
atmosphere of “unanimous agreement” and “a unity of thought.”1 However, from the 
point of announcing the Declaration it became increasingly apparent that each of the 
Allied powers had independent and divergent foreign policy agendas. Compromises 
made with Stalin at Yalta had left the American political framework of self-
determination without the machinery to ensure its implementation. 
Following Yalta the Soviet Union pursued its own policy objectives based on 
establishing “friendly governments” on its borders. The political reality playing itself 
out was that Stalin was disinterested in America’s abstract principles of “free” 
political systems and was determined to ensure that basic Soviet security requirements 
were met. Stalin believed that, just as the US claimed to have a special interest in 
Latin America, Russia should be protected by a security ring of pro-Moscow states 
along its frontiers.2  
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Stalin preferred the notorious ‘percentages’ agreement made with Churchill in 
Moscow in October 1944 based on the traditional system of Great Power spheres of 
influence to any conceptual American plan that did not guarantee fundamental Soviet 
security needs. Because the Declaration failed to establish sufficient implementing 
mechanisms as the war was coming to an end the military situation also gave Stalin a 
superior position in Eastern Europe from which to impose his own policy objectives. 
As the Wehrmacht receded the Red Army filled the power vacuum in the former Axis 
satellites of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as much of Czechoslovakia, 
Poland and Yugoslavia. In these countries local Communist governments were rapidly 
established and despite Anglo-American demands for representative interim 
governments based on the Atlantic Charter principles enshrined at Yalta, the 
geopolitical reality on the ground overruled western political and ideological 
preference. 
In response to the emergence of Soviet-backed Communist police states 
throughout Eastern Europe the US stringently refused to accept Soviet violations of 
the Yalta agreements. Following Roosevelt’s death in April the Truman government 
failed to adapt to the political situation by seeking a compromise, resulting in a 
diplomatic impasse that was glossed over at the Potsdam Conference in July but was 
fully apparent to the public by the time of the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings 
in London and Moscow later in the year. By the end of 1945 minority 
unrepresentative Communist regimes had been established in every Eastern European 
country except Czechoslovakia, infuriating western diplomats that the Soviets had 
brazenly violated the terms of the “Declaration of Liberated Europe” agreed to at 
Yalta.  
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It was in this atmosphere of deteriorating relations and a stubborn refusal to 
compromise on both sides that the US became increasingly suspicious of Soviet 
intentions. The failure, beginning at Yalta, to avoid Europe dividing into two camps 
was entrenched by deep US suspicions of a wider significance to Soviet actions in 
Eastern Europe. As early as April 1945 US Ambassador in Moscow W. Averell 
Harriman was describing Soviet expansion as a “barbarian invasion of Europe” 
manifesting a “threat to the world and to us.” Harriman explained that the threat came 
not from the establishment of satellite states in Eastern Europe, but from the intention 
to expand further that he believed Soviet action illustrated: 
“Russia is building a tier of friendly states [in Eastern Europe] and 
our task is to make it difficult for her to do so, since to build one tier of 
states implies the possibility of further tiers, layer on layer.”3 
 
Over the next year US strategists, drawn towards the perception that Moscow 
was perfidiously expansionist, reached a general consensus that Soviet momentum 
should be confronted and checked. This stemmed from nervous interpretations of 
Soviet actions as increasingly ominous signals of the aggressive nature of the 
communist system. Stalin’s speech on February 9 1946 announcing a reversion to the 
Five Year Plans of the 1930s precipitated alarm bells. The State Department’s George 
Kennan wrote his influential Long Telegram from Moscow in response to the speech. 
Kennan did not interpret it in realist terms as an announcement of economic measures 
to reconstruct Russia’s post-war infrastructure. Instead he highlighted the belligerent 
ideological aspects of the speech in which Stalin claimed the “USSR still lives in 
antagonistic “capitalist encirclement” with which in the long run there can be no 
permanent peaceful coexistence.” This perfectly illustrated the symbolic threat now 
posed by Moscow. Although the basis of Soviet actions was a “traditional and 
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instinctive Russian sense of insecurity” Kennan proceeded to describe an 
ideologically-driven movement dedicated to expansion and absolute global power: 
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically 
to the belief that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, 
that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society 
be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international 
authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.  
 
Kennan’s perspective necessitated a major theoretical leap in judging Soviet 
intentions, overemphasising the ideological premise of the Marxist-Leninist objective 
of global hegemony rather than balancing it with a realist evaluation of power politics. 
He argued that the desperate situation in war-torn Europe made US action urgent and 
that the scope of the threat necessitated the equivalent mobilisation of resources as in 
times of war.4 
US fears were enhanced by Churchill’s speech on March 5 at Fulton, Missouri 
when he publicly articulated the growing perception of expanding Soviet power: 
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain 
has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of 
the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, 
Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities 
and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, 
and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but 
to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from 
Moscow.5  
 
Churchill’s reading of the nature and threat of Soviet expansion was consistent with 
Kennan’s hypothesis. Convinced that Soviet actions were symptomatic of long-term 
hegemonic objectives, Truman’s circle now interpreted Soviet actions beyond Eastern 
Europe as vindicating their suspicions. The continued presence of Soviet garrisons in 
Northern Iran in March 1946 appeared to justify American anxiety. Although US 
influence was extremely limited in Eastern Europe, Washington resolved to protect 
areas where it could exert its geopolitical power against Soviet interference. Western 
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pressure soon persuaded Stalin to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran but, consistent 
with Kennan’s hypothesis, this illustrated not a willingness to cooperate with the West 
but rather the amenability of Soviet designs to force alone.  
In July Truman instructed special counsel Clark Clifford to compile a list of 
examples of Stalin reneging on his agreements. George Elsey joined Clifford and 
expanded the study to investigate Soviet aims. The report then compiled the 
judgements of all the major governmental departments including State, War, the 
Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Handed to 
Truman on September 24, its conclusions represented the first inter-departmental 
consensus-building document of the Cold War.  
The Clifford-Elsey report stated that America’s “gravest problem” was its 
relationship with the USSR and concurred that the basis of the threat was ideological 
as well as military. The situation was so serious that it “may determine whether or not 
there will be a third World War.” The combination of ideological fanaticism and 
geopolitical power proved that the Soviet leadership was pursuing “a course of 
aggrandizement designed to lead to eventual world domination by the U.S.S.R.” 
Adhering to Kennan’s interpretation, ideology based on the “Marxian theory of 
ultimate destruction of capitalist states by communist states” motivated Moscow’s 
behaviour. The USSR’s growing geopolitical power gave it the potential means to 
protect and consolidate its own security and adopt an opportunistic and flexible 
foreign policy of expansion. The report concluded that the “Kremlin acknowledges no 
limit to the eventual power of the Soviet Union” thereby posing an immediate threat 
to American security. This was further augmented by Moscow’s belief in the 
inevitability of a war between East and West: 
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A direct threat to American security is implicit in Soviet foreign policy 
which is designed to prepare the Soviet Union for war with the leading 
capitalistic nations of the world. 
  
The paper recommended US courses of action that became predominant in the 
evolving policy. Washington “should support and assist all democratic countries 
which are in any way menaced or endangered by the USSR” in order to prevent the 
successful opportunistic growth of communism into liberal societies. The provision of 
military aid “in case of attack” was deemed “a last resort” with direct economic 
intervention preferred to constitute “a more effective barrier to communism.”6  
Truman was deeply impressed by the study.7 The consensus in Washington 
was solidifying that the post-war Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was the 
manifestation of an intrinsically hostile ideological force. Ideology was becoming 
increasingly enmeshed with power politics. Entangling security strategy with its 
ideological perspective of international relations, Eastern Europe represented a 
paradox in US policy. Although Washington essentially consigned secondary 
geopolitical importance to the region, its symbolic significance contributed greatly to 
the deterioration of relations between the wartime allies. Washington’s rhetorical 
commitment to the rectitude of Western democracy shaped its interpretation of 
Moscow’s expansion as an antagonistic development representing the fate awaiting 
Western Europe and eventually the United States if allowed to proceed unchecked. 
As early as 1946 therefore, US policy was moving beyond simply containing 
the USSR. Washington’s gravitation towards a strategy confining Soviet expansion 
within its present limits represented the limitations of geopolitical power. It did not 
represent a restriction of its ideological ambitions. While hoping to avoid a direct 
confrontation with Moscow and general war, Washington had reconciled ideological 
ambitions and geopolitical restraints into a confrontational strategy. The opportunity 
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to demonstrate this position came with Stalin’s request for a Soviet presence in the 
Dardanelles Straits. Alongside the continuing civil war in Greece, Stalin’s advances 
appeared to illustrate subversive efforts to gain undue influence in the Mediterranean, 
and Washington responded with a show of strength to deter any unilateral Soviet 
moves.  
Truman then announced the decision to intervene in the Greek civil war. The 
unrest was framed as another Soviet stepping stone to global domination. The Truman 
Doctrine of March 1947 was not primarily significant for the military aid it offered to 
Greece and Turkey but for the wider ideologically-based commitment that it 
represented. Intervention was founded on the decision to challenge global communist 
expansion, rather than on the strategic importance of the countries in question. The 
‘loss’ of Greece or Turkey to an engorged Soviet Russia would directly threaten 
American geopolitical interests, particularly in the Middle East and Western Europe. 
It would also pose an ideological threat to the value-system and institutions of the 
‘free world’. The infection of Western Europe could not be allowed, resulting in an 
unprecedented peacetime commitment to safeguard America’s regional interests.  
The Truman administration adopted a second means of containing 
communism following the recommendations of the Clifford-Elsey report, with 
economic intervention in Europe. In April Secretary of State George C. Marshall 
created the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) to design a European Recovery Program 
(ERP). The urgent humanitarian need to rebuild war-torn Europe through emergency 
economic relief also offered the US Government a means to politically stabilise parts 
of the continent not under Soviet control. Geopolitical and ideological interests 
complemented each other in rebuilding Western Europe’s infrastructure and 
defending its free institutions from the insidious designs of communism. Economic 
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instability was regarded as a principal catalyst for the spread of communism so the 
injection of US aid could serve a double purpose by rebuilding and protecting 
Western Europe’s economic and political institutions  
ERP aid was offered to the Eastern European governments and the Soviet 
Union as well. The PPS anticipated that Moscow would compel its satellites to reject 
the aid package because “the Russian satellite countries would either exclude 
themselves by unwillingness to accept the proposed conditions or agree to abandon 
the exclusive orientation of their economies.”8 The conditions attached to ERP 
compelled the recipient countries to integrate into the US-led capitalist economic 
system. Soviet acceptance of these conditions would therefore enhance US ambitions 
of westernising the Soviet bloc politically and economically. The more likely scenario 
was that the Eastern bloc would reject the offer. This was also regarded as consistent 
with containment because Moscow would be compelled to assume sole economic 
responsibility for its satellites while its war-torn economy was still recovering. The 
ERP therefore represented an early example of political warfare in the Cold War by 
using economic means to indirectly place greater strains on the international 
communist system, thereby hindering further Soviet expansion. 
The implementation of the Marshall Plan prompted Washington to seek ways 
to safeguard its economic investments. Strategists feared that France and Italy would 
succumb to legal communist advances in democratic elections to be held before US 
aid would bring stability. Now head of the PPS, Kennan suggested political warfare 
was the answer. The National Security Council (NSC) adopted NSC 1/3 which 
mobilised a covert propaganda campaign to strengthen the non-communist political 
parties in France and Italy. Political warfare could help to prevent a chain-reaction of 
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communist electoral victories in the rest of the Western bloc by preventing precedent 
gains: 
With Communist control of France and Italy established, Communist 
influence might be expected to increase rapidly in other Western 
European countries and avenues opened up for extension of Communist 
activities in the colonial world from Dakar to Saigon. West Germany 
would become an untenable island in a Communist sea.9 
 
“[C]overt psychological operations” were therefore formally established as a 
component of US foreign policy with Truman’s approval of NSC 4-A in December 
1947.10  
The rationale for adopting a policy beyond the containment of Soviet  
expansion further than Eastern Europe had been fed by the consolidation of Soviet 
power through local Communist Party domination of all the Eastern European 
governments (except Czechoslovakia at this point). The nature of covert operations 
suggested that they could be conducted in Eastern Europe as well as France and Italy. 
Kennan now pressed for the expansion of containment from simply a reactive, 
defensive strategy. In an article published pseudonymously in Foreign Affairs he 
elaborated on the defensive aspects of containment: 
[T]he United States has it in its power to increase enormously the 
strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin 
a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to 
observe in recent years.  
 
Through the consolidation of a Western bloc led by the United States, Soviet power 
could be contained at least within its current limits. But Kennan left ambiguous the 
objective in moderating Moscow’s behaviour. His presentation implied that the US 
should, in the long-term, take the offensive and undermine communist-dominated 
governments antithetical to Western democracy in the satellite regimes and ultimately 
the Soviet Union itself. The logical culmination of this strategy would be the 
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liberation of the Soviet bloc. This exposed the geopolitical dilemma that liberation 
would effectively mean war, so Kennan evaded the complexity and equivocally 
described the ultimate goal of containment as “either the break-up or the gradual 
mellowing of Soviet power.”11  
Because the utopian vision of a ‘free’ Eastern Europe was increasingly seen as 
compatible with the overall geopolitical need to challenge Soviet power it gave 
greater incentive to an aggressive strategy involving political warfare. A liberated 
Eastern Europe would fulfil America’s vision of democratic order and enhance its 
security needs through the retraction and possible destruction of antagonistic Soviet 
military power driven by its hostile ideology. As a consequence, the CIA’s Special 
Procedures Group (SPG) was authorised to begin a peace-time psychological warfare 
campaign through propaganda radio broadcasts and balloon drops behind the Iron 
Curtain.  
Policy debate in Washington focussed not on the necessity of containment but 
the scope that it should involve. Charles Bohlen, another Russian expert at the State 
Department, advocated the containment of Soviet power as the means to ultimately 
defeating Moscow and liberating the satellites. Deterrence through Western unity and 
preponderant strength were required in the short-term: 
The array of potential strength which would be lined up against the Soviet 
Union and its satellites […] will in the last analysis determine whether 
war will result or whether the Soviet or non-Soviet world will be able to 
find a modus vivendi which will permit some stabilisation of the world 
situation for at least some period of years.  
 
However, if the global schism was “to be solved short of war, it must result in a 
radical and basic change in Soviet policies.”12 Like Kennan, Bohlen was unwilling to 
recommend a military conflict with the Soviet Union in order to overcome the Soviet 
threat. Instead he pointed to containment as a long-term strategy to fulfil American 
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objectives by eventually rolling back Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. The 
specific process of inducing this retraction of power was left undefined, but the 
creation of a covert branch of government offered a means of filling the strategic 
vacuum. 
The ERP indirectly acted as another catalyst for the advancement of political 
warfare. When the Soviet bloc rejected the ERP as Washington had anticipated the 
threat of Western encroachment on Moscow’s key security interests propelled Stalin 
to consolidate his grip on the region. In September 1947 Andrei Zhdanov announced 
the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) to coordinate 
political warfare against the ERP and to enhance the international communist 
movement. Stalin then terminated any previous tolerance of democracy in Eastern 
Europe, drawing the satellite economies and political systems closer to Russia’s. The 
Czech coup of February 1948 represented the final nail in the coffin for independent 
regimes in the region. The PPS had anticipated that the ERP might directly lead both 
to a hardening of the Kremlin’s position and to Czechoslovakia’s total absorption into 
the communist bloc in November 1947: 
The halt in the communist advance is forcing Moscow to 
consolidate its hold on Eastern Europe. It will probably have to clamp 
down completely on Czechoslovakia. For if the political trend in Europe 
turns against communism, a relatively free Czechoslovakia could become 
a threatening salient in Moscow’s political position in Eastern Europe. 
  
Although the PPS acknowledged that this would be “a purely defensive move” in 
response to the threat posed by the ERP on Soviet interests, the Czech coup generated 
a war scare in Washington.13 Marshall aid had not been intended to encourage 
Moscow’s “gradual mellowing” and ameliorate East-West tensions, but it did not 
offer an alternative strategy to induce the destruction of Soviet power either. 
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Meanwhile Stalin had raised the stakes and consolidated local communist party 
control in the satellites.  
The US response was to formalise the role of political warfare as the primary 
means of challenging communist power in Eastern Europe. NSC 7 was formulated in 
March 1948 in light of the Czech coup. It reiterated the Machiavellian interpretation 
that the “ultimate objective of Soviet-directed world communism is the domination of 
the world.” The proof of Soviet Russia’s “drive toward world conquest” was the 
expansion of Stalinist power into Eastern Europe: “It has established satellite police 
states in Poland, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and 
Czechoslovakia.” Emphasis was placed on the ideological nature of Soviet expansion 
as an immoral and alien doctrine, reducing Moscow’s geopolitical motivations. 
Reacting to the “alarming success” of the hostile communist system, Washington 
concluded that “a defensive policy cannot be considered an effectual means of 
checking the momentum of communist expansion and inducing the Kremlin to 
relinquish its aggressive designs.” Instead the situation required “a world-wide 
counter-offensive aimed at mobilizing and strengthening our own and anti-communist 
forces in the non-Soviet world, and at undermining the strength of the communist 
forces in the Soviet world.”14  
On April 30 the PPS called for “The Inauguration of Organized Political 
Warfare” to fill the operational vacuum created by an offensive strategy. Describing 
the Truman Doctrine and ERP as overt measures of political warfare it concluded that 
the “time is now fully ripe for the creation of a covert political warfare operations 
directorate within the Government” to employ “all the means at [the] nation’s 
command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”15 By the summer the 
electoral crises in France and Italy had been averted.  The perceived success of the 
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covert propaganda campaign in Western Europe strengthened the impetus for 
transferring these tactics to the Soviet bloc and Kennan urged that “[o]ur objective 
now must be to obtain the retraction of Soviet power from Eastern Europe.”16 Under 
the direction of the PPS action plan to conduct political and psychological warfare 
behind the Iron Curtain, NSC 4-A was superseded by NSC 10/2, giving a broad 
definition to covert operations: 
Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: 
propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including 
sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion 
against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance 
movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of 
indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free 
world.  
 
The integration of covert operations into foreign policy illustrated 
Washington’s growing entanglement of ideological and geopolitical objectives. The 
commitment to implement its ideological objectives generated the willingness to take 
the offensive in the evolving entrenchment with Moscow. But geopolitical restraints 
also shaped the character of the offensive. NSC 10/2 included a clause conditioning 
political warfare on the government’s ability to “plausibly disclaim any 
responsibility” for clandestine operations, reflecting its wish not to escalate operations 
into an overt confrontation with the Kremlin.17 ‘Containment’ therefore disguised an 
increasingly aggressive and multifaceted branch of the emerging policy towards the 
Soviet Union and its satellites, but it did not go so far as to commit the US to an overt 
military confrontation. As Lucas observes, even before the first flashpoint of the Cold 
War, the June Soviet blockade of access to West Berlin, America was mobilised for a 
covert war offensive in an effort to implement its ideological objectives in areas 
beyond its geopolitical sway.18 
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The Office of Special Projects (OSP), soon renamed the Office of Policy 
Coordination (OPC), was established under the authority of NSC 10/2 to conduct 
political warfare. Operational from September 1 under the leadership of Frank 
Wisner, OPC immediately took up its mandate and targeted Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, conducting paramilitary and guerrilla missions as directed. Albania was 
the first target, and Wisner described the operation as a “clinical test” of the feasibility 
of rollback.19 Conducted with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the long-
running operation continuously failed to overthrow Enver Hoxha’s regime (partly due 
to the Soviet mole Kim Philby acting as SIS liaison in Washington), yet OPC 
operatives remained undeterred. Albania became the first target of OPC’s many 
paramilitary operations aimed at developing underground resistance groups for 
peacetime and wartime operations involving sabotage, guerrilla  warfare and “wet” 
kidnapping and assassination missions behind the Iron Curtain.20 The failure of the 
Albanian test case did not prevent OPC’s rapid expansion and the spread of its 
political warfare campaigns across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union by 1951.21   
With covert warfare operations in place Washington now reviewed policy 
objectives. Approved by Truman on November 23, NSC 20/4 reaffirmed the 
ideologically-based premise that “Communist ideology and Soviet behaviour clearly 
demonstrate that the ultimate objective of the leaders of the USSR is the domination 
of the world.” The Soviet harnessing of military power was evaluated in the context of 
an ideological conflict between the insatiably aggressive communist doctrine and the 
democratic values of the ‘free’ world. The plight of Eastern Europe was testament to 
Soviet malignancy, yet more alarmingly the “immediate goal of top priority since the 
recent war has been the political conquest of western Europe.” Soviet domination of 
the satellites generated an American sense of vulnerability that the US-led democratic 
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order of the Western bloc was imperilled, shaping NSC 20/4’s general conclusions of 
Soviet objectives. It also reinforced the conviction that US countermeasures were 
necessary to challenge and ultimately defeat the Soviet threat according to certain 
aims:  
To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power 
and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian 
boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities 
independent of the USSR.”  
 
Liberating Eastern Europe was a fundamental part of the overall policy aimed at 
overcoming the communist threat but the NSC was unwilling to provide the military 
commitment required to achieve this aim, stipulating that objectives should be 
fulfilled “by methods short of war.”22 Soviet military power continued to be a 
sufficient deterrent in an area of secondary geopolitical importance to Washington, 
consecrating the space for covert warfare to operate. But this exposed other strategic 
tensions for it was by no means certain that the limited political warfare measures 
designed to avoid an overt conflict would be sufficient in fulfilling America’s 
objectives. 
This generated ambiguity in the policy directives as to what lengths the US 
should resort to. The goal of Eastern European self-determination was consistent with 
the “Declaration of Liberated Europe” made at Yalta yet this had failed to induce a 
willingness in American statesmen to wage war against Moscow. Truman remained 
averse to taking the ultimate step in confronting Russian domination because Eastern 
Europe was peripheral to America’s primary geopolitical interests. A clandestine 
campaign compatible with containment because it would not provoke overt war was 
settled on, aiming to unsettle the satellite regimes and, at best, detach them from the 
Soviet orbit.  
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In 1949 policy specific to Eastern Europe was formulated. Washington 
searched for a more confrontational strategy to challenge Soviet power, arguing that 
the “time is now ripe for us to place greater emphasis on the offensive to consider 
whether we cannot do more to cause the elimination or at least a reduction of 
predominant Soviet influence in the satellite states of Eastern Europe.” But the danger 
of invoking a strong response inherent in decisive US intervention in its antagonist’s 
sphere of influence continued to pose a dilemma: 
Were we to set as our immediate goal the replacement of totalitarianism 
by democracy, an overwhelming portion of the task would fall on us, and 
we would find ourselves directly engaging the Kremlin’s prestige and 
provoking strong Soviet reaction, possibly in the form of war or at least in 
vigorous indirect aggression.23 
 
Policy papers glossed over the fundamental tension between strategy and objectives, 
retaining liberation as an ultimate aim. A progress report did acknowledge the 
practical difficulties facing satellite governments should they seek to break away from 
the Soviet orbit:  
There are, however, great obstacles to our making any immediate or 
spectacular progress toward the goal [of satellite independence] in view of 
the presence in those countries of Soviet armed forces as instruments of 
intimidation and the police power in the hands of the present satellite 
governments.24 
 
But this did not alter the fundamental dilemma. The mythical feasibility of liberation 
without war remained the preferred means of resolving the geopolitical and 
ideological antagonism in the minds of US planners.  
An external development did produce a shift in policy emphasis, however. 
Washington turned to an intermediate objective considered both feasible and less 
likely to result in general war when Tito publicly split from the Soviet bloc in June 
1948. Tito’s defiance of Stalin was regarded by the West as an example to be 
encouraged on the other satellite regimes in order to unsettle Moscow’s centralised 
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authority. If the US was “willing that, as a first step, schismatic Communist regimes 
supplant the present Stalinist governments, we stand a much better chance of 
success.” The second step would then be to encourage “national Communist” 
governments to reform themselves further and align with the United States: 
The problem is to facilitate the development of heretical Communism 
without at the same time seriously impairing our chances for ultimately 
replacing this intermediate totalitarianism with tolerant regimes congenial 
to the Western world.25 
 
The new policy suggested a precarious balancing act between nourishing national 
communist regimes still linked to some degree with Moscow and supporting the 
promotion of pro-Western democratic governments. Washington’s new short-term 
objective of fostering heretical communism was as ambiguous and precarious as the 
long-term goal predicated on aligning Eastern Europe with the West. The extent, short 
of war, to which the US was willing to encourage the satellite regimes to stray 
towards heretical communism was unclear. Should a communist government 
challenge Soviet supremacy as Yugoslavia had done it would risk provoking Soviet 
military intervention. Presumably Western military and economic aid would be 
extended to an emerging national communist regime, but a consequent conflict with 
Russian forces attempting to reassert their authority increased the likelihood of an 
escalation to general war between Russia and America. This contradicted the premise 
that heretical communism was less likely to induce war with Russia. In any case the 
new strategic emphasis was not transferred to an operational shift at the working 
level. OPC continued to infiltrate the Soviet bloc not to induce modification in the 
target regimes and foster national communist governments but to destabilise and 
overthrow them completely.  
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Washington considered the status of Finland a second model which might be 
replicated elsewhere. Helsinki enjoyed the unique acceptance of both blocs in the 
early Cold War division of Europe. America judged the Finnish government 
democratically representative. In turn, Moscow viewed Helsinki as tolerably aligned 
to Soviet foreign policy, signing a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance in April 
1948 granting the Finns autonomy over their domestic affairs.  
Unlike the spread of ‘Titoism’ aimed at creating and exploiting internal strains 
in the Soviet system, the promotion of ‘Finlandisation’ would move the satellites into 
a neutral position still representing an advance for US interests. A ring of neutral 
countries in Eastern Europe presented a further advantage in potentially providing the 
double containment of Germany as well as Russia. Whereas the spread of national 
communism or the complete rollback of Soviet power could raise the possibility of 
greatly increased German power in the region, a buffer of neutral states might yield a 
delicate balance of power on the continent between Russia, America and Western 
Europe, thus negating the threat that a reunited and ascendant Germany could pose in 
the future.26  
Although Finlandisation seemed to offer some benefits over Titoism, it 
implied opening a dialogue with Russia. Washington was reluctant because of its 
scepticism of Moscow’s willingness to make genuine concessions. It believed that 
negotiations should only be conducted to formalise Soviet concessions once 
containment had successfully coerced the Kremlin into modification. In other words, 
they would mark the end rather than the means of US objectives:  
[I]t is important to emphasize that [negotiated settlements] can only record 
the progress which the free world will have made in creating a political 
and economic system in the world so successful that the frustration of the 
Kremlin’s design for world domination will be complete.  
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Negotiations before this point would only lead to the formalisation of spheres of 
influence:  
In light of present trends, the Soviet Union will not withdraw and the only 
conceivable basis for a general settlement would be spheres of influence 
and of no influence- a “settlement” which the Kremlin could readily 
exploit to its great advantage.27  
 
Although the Finnish model was discussed during Truman’s tenure, its promotion 
gained wider currency from 1955 when the Eisenhower administration grew more 
amenable to opening discussions with the Soviet leadership. The Truman 
administrations hard line illustrated its persistent refusal to acknowledge Eastern 
Europe as a Soviet sphere and the continuing determination to roll back Russian 
power despite the inherent practical difficulties. The shifting dynamics of the Cold 
War confrontation would yet influence Truman’s strategy towards Eastern Europe. 
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2 
NEW THREATS AND OLD THEORIES 
The Dilemma of Liberation for the Democrats, 1950-
1953 
By the end of 1949 American foreign policy was faced with new complexities. 
The successful Soviet test explosion of an atomic bomb had turned the premises of 
Washington’s general strategy upside down.  The greatly enhanced Soviet nuclear 
threat was augmented by the ‘loss’ of China to communism, adding conventional and 
symbolic power to the Eastern bloc. The Truman administration needed to balance 
these developments against the provocative covert war being conducted behind the 
Iron Curtain. 
The initial response was to establish a review of US military options in light of 
the Soviet atomic capability. But the study’s scope was soon broadened reacting to the 
ideological as well as the military and geopolitical threat posed by the Soviet bloc, 
thus expanding the scope of ‘warfare’ options that the US could adopt to counter it. 
Truman only then approved NSC 68 a year after the test explosion and Mao Ze 
Dong’s rise, when the outbreak of the Korean War seemed to vindicate its alarming 
tone. The assumption was that Stalin had instigated the North Korean invasion 
illustrating a new boldness in Soviet tactics.  
NSC 68 strayed beyond a realist geopolitical review of policy examining the 
impact of the loss of America’s nuclear monopoly. Instead American options and 
objectives were contextualised within an ideological struggle in which the life or 
death “not only of this Republic but of civilization itself” was at stake. The principal 
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conflict was over ideas and not military conquest. War with the USSR, therefore, 
would not resolve the present antagonism: 
Military victory alone would only partially and perhaps temporarily affect 
the fundamental conflict, for although the ability of the Kremlin to 
threaten our security might be for a time destroyed, the resurgence of 
totalitarian forces and the re-establishment of the Soviet system or its 
equivalent would not be long delayed unless great progress were made in 
the fundamental conflict.  
 
This conclusion represented an ideological response to the geopolitical reality now 
facing strategists. A military conflict with the Soviet Union could not be won in the 
nuclear age. NSC 68 responded by depicting an ideological and political struggle that 
could still be won with strategic sleight of hand representing an evasion of 
geopolitical realities rather than a coherent shift in policy.  
Having ruled out the viability of war to achieve national objectives, all measures 
short of war would be engaged to win the political conflict. The malignant nature of 
communism protected American moral virtue assuring that the “integrity of our 
system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-
violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design.” These measures 
would be directed towards the strategy of assisting the internal collapse of the Soviet 
system in the long-term to illustrate the superiority of US ideology: 
  Practical and ideological implications therefore both impel us to 
the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the superiority 
of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to 
change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to 
frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system.1 
 
The preoccupation with ideology stripped policy-makers of their one clear means of 
defeating the USSR. Washington would still strive towards liberation, but the massive 
military build up and development of the hydrogen bomb were not planned for this 
objective but to deter retaliation: “it is clear that a substantial and rapid building up of 
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strength in the free world is necessary to support a firm policy intended to check and 
to roll back the Kremlin’s drive for world domination.” The lengthy ruminations 
failed to resolve how measures short of war would force the Kremlin’s hand. The 
definitions of containment did not clarify this, shifting from an aggressive to a 
defensive tone within the document.2 These inconsistencies confused whether the US 
would, in fact, also be open to negotiations over Eastern Europe, something 
compatible with the purported aim of gradually retracting Soviet power without war. 
But instead an escalation of covert operations was called for: 
Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by 
covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and 
psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and 
revolt in selected strategic satellite countries. 
 
The short-term intensification of operations behind the Iron Curtain was totally 
inconsistent with the long-term goal of inducing the peaceful withdrawal of Soviet 
troops, as was the incitement to revolution of Eastern Europeans. NSC 68 entangled 
geopolitical requirements in the context of the nuclear age with the ideological 
imperative of challenging communism. The requisite course of action in the context of 
Soviet nuclear power was absolutely incompatible with the necessary means required 
to roll back and defeat communism. The former demanded a lessening of international 
tension and disarmament talks while the latter would ultimately require war. 
Geopolitical limitations did not result in the abandonment of liberation, however. The 
advocates of an activist strategy were as determined as ever that Washington’s 
ideological goals be retained. Moral rectitude if not geopolitical reality vindicated the 
course of US policy, even in the age of nuclear proliferation: 
Some further argue that the free world is probably unable, except under 
the crises of war, to mobilize and direct its resources to the checking and 
rolling back of the Kremlin’s drive for world dominion. This is a powerful 
argument in the light of history, but the considerations against war are so 
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compelling that the free world must demonstrate that this argument is 
wrong.3 
 
OPC’s operations continued to meet stiff resistance in the satellites after NSC 
68’s implementation. Although covert warfare heightened international tension 
without producing any results, the review of NSC 68 did not question the strategic 
soundness of America’s ideological struggle over Eastern Europe. On the contrary, by 
August 1951 NSC 114/1 evaluated that US countermeasures were increasingly needed 
as the West was “already in a period of acute danger [which] will continue until the 
United States and its allies achieve an adequate position of strength.” The Korean War 
combined with the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal and delivery systems would 
presumably allow Stalin to take ever-greater risks, so it was exponentially more 
propitious to place Moscow on the defensive without provoking war.  
Yet policy was formulated on the premise that the Kremlin believed “an armed 
conflict […] is eventually inevitable” and would “[p]revent the development of any 
threat to the vital interests of the U.S.S.R or to Soviet control of the satellites.” US 
covert efforts were directed towards detaching the satellites from Soviet control, but 
this would provoke war according to the estimates of Soviet intentions. Essentially 
NSC 114/1 spelled out the impossibility of liberation without war. Yet the belief that 
it was morally essential perpetuated the myth that peaceful roll back was 
geopolitically achievable. Rather than abandon liberation, America’s quest for 
satellite independence was intensified.4 
Debate within government continued to thrash over the inconsistencies and 
contradictions between objectives and the covert campaign behind the Iron Curtain. 
There was an increasing recognition that liberation was unachievable short of war. A 
full-scale conflict with Russia was becoming unthinkable with the nearing of nuclear 
 30
parity, and once a preventative war had been ruled out realists like Bohlen argued that 
the geopolitical situation dictated negotiations and coexistence with the Eastern bloc 
as the only feasibly option. 
The government could not simply drop its ideological goals, although calls for a 
political settlement and an end to international hostility provided compelling 
arguments: 
Since this “containment” policy can eventually only bring us face to 
face with the threat of general war with the Soviets, is it not logical to 
proceed now to deal directly with Moscow on the political front?5 
 
This was all the more perplexing because the US was waging a political and not a 
military war against the Soviet Union. But it was not prepared to resolve the war 
through the political medium of negotiations. The administration well understood that 
the political settlement of the Cold War would result in the confounding of America’s 
ideological goals. The US would not be able to bring democracy to Eastern Europe at 
the negotiating table but would instead be compelled to agree to mutually acceptable 
terms with Moscow. Talks would, in other words, expose the limitations of US power, 
rather than offer the US unilateral fulfilment of its objectives. Any peace settlement 
between the two blocs would focus on resolving differences over issues of primary 
geopolitical concern. Compromise solutions would naturally focus on Germany, 
Austria, Japan and Korea, not on the politically-peripheral Eastern Europe where the 
US possessed no diplomatic leverage over the USSR. In all likelihood the normalising 
of relations between East and West would formalise Eastern Europe as a Soviet 
sphere of influence. This was unpalatable to Washington. 
Charles Bohlen mooted the emphasis in US policy papers of Moscow’s 
fundamental drive for world conquest as an accurate basis for determining policy. He 
consistently proposed that retention of Soviet internal power was, in fact, the 
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Kremlin’s primary concern. In other words he posited that the Kremlin was driven by 
security interests ahead of ideological factors. This diverged from the fundamental 
assumption of Moscow’s insatiable quest for global hegemony that had supported the 
entire ideological edifice shaping an integral part of US policy since the beginning of 
the Cold War. The incontrovertible fact of the Kremlin’s aggressive design had 
justified whatever counter-measures short of war Washington responded with. Bohlen 
questioned the advisability of the current political warfare campaign for being too 
provocative and unable to win the political war against communism without taking 
America into a general military conflict.6  
Paul Nitze, now head of the PPS and principal author of NSC 68, remained 
committed to an aggressive covert strategy and the conviction behind it that Moscow 
was “animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its 
absolute authority over the rest of the world.”7 US counter-force was essential, not 
only to liberate the satellite regimes, but more immediately to destabilise the Soviet 
system thereby staving off the inevitable Soviet assault on the free world inherent in 
its desire for global domination. It was Nitze’s line of thought rather than Bohlen’s 
that was accommodated in NSC 10/5, authorising further enhancement of American 
covert warfare capabilities “when and where appropriate in the light of U.S. and 
Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, [to contribute] to the retraction and reduction 
of Soviet power and influence [….]”8 The debate continued, despite the shift towards 
roll back. 
Friction between an emphasis on long-term ideological objectives and short-
term geopolitical realities continued to perplex. NSC 114/2 reiterated the limitations 
of US influence and the likelihood of war breaking out should Moscow perceive the 
imminent detachment of one of its satellites: 
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It is evident that our efforts to contain, limit and bring about by peaceful 
means a retraction of Soviet power and influence and a change in Soviet 
conduct of international relations will be opposed by the Kremlin and will 
be regarded by it as a threat to its security. 
 
Although covert operations were now theoretically balanced against the risk of war, it 
was acknowledged that their successful conclusion could only provoke war. Therefore 
political warfare could only be provocative: 
[T]he Soviet Union must be increasingly concerned with the pace of 
Western countermeasures, which it doubtless views as an ever more 
serious threat not only to the accomplishment of its overall objectives but 
eventually to the security of the Soviet orbit itself. 
 
Despite a policy level recognition that liberation through covert warfare was either 
futile or unacceptably provocative, the moral exigency of defeating communism and 
establishing universal democratic systems of government was so ingrained that it 
could not be disentangled from the factors restricting it. The administration certainly 
could not abandon liberation as an aspiration, leaving both strategy and objective in 
place at the operational level.  
In practice covert political warfare had completely failed to liberate any of the 
satellites despite OPC’s numerous missions into the Eastern bloc (including 
Yugoslavia regardless of its growing links with the West). The effort to organise 
resistance groups, destabilise the communist regimes and have democratic elements 
overthrow them was as elusive now as it had been when covert warfare had first been 
integrated into overall policy. The lack of a tangible success, compounded by the 
provocative nature of political warfare, strengthened the case against the ‘secret’ war 
fuelling the debate between containment and liberation. The ‘covert’ war was also 
failing to fulfil its mandate of being plausibly deniable, and the exposure of operations 
and capture of US agents and equipment by communist authorities increased tensions 
and exacerbated policy disagreement. The most notable example, the bungled 
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operation to finance and equip the Polish anti-communist Freedom and Independence 
(WIN by its Polish acronym) movement in December 1952 brought the failure of 
liberation operations temporarily to the foreground, but it was not significant enough 
to persuade Truman to decisively relinquish the avowed aim once and for all.  
Korea illustrated the dangerous geopolitical reality that restricted each side 
from intervening in the other’s de facto sphere of influence. With the threat of nuclear 
escalation during the flash points of the war, engaging Soviet prestige by intervening 
covertly in Eastern Europe engendered high risks with negligible benefits. A progress 
report on NSC 58/2 in 1951 noted the indirect restraining influence of the Korean War 
limiting the implementation of Eastern European policy, but did not regard this as 
sufficient reason to relinquish the campaign: 
Inasmuch as the USSR is not itself openly engaged militarily in the Far 
East, the restraint on United States freedom of action in Eastern Europe is 
not entirely limited.9 
 
Instead of accepting that geopolitics made US policy objectives self-defeating as 
symbolised by the stalemate in Korea, in overall terms the conflict gave greater 
operational impetus to the covert branch of US policy in Eastern Europe and globally. 
It also led to a greater emphasis on coordinating and planning political and 
psychological warfare reflected by the creation of the Psychological Strategy Board 
(PSB) half a year after NSC 68’s implementation.10 
 The overzealous desire to confront Moscow was reflected by the inclusion of 
the Kersten Amendment in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Congress allocated $100 
million “for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from [the Soviet 
bloc] either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] or for other purposes.”11 Congressional 
belligerence in publicly endorsing US-financed émigré armies represented only a 
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naïve symbolic gesture, not a viable means of defeating communism. Misguided 
thinking was matched by the PSB. During the first meeting of the Director’s Group 
programs were discussed that could achieve US objectives as stated in NSC 20/4 and 
NSC 10/5: 
[The psychological campaign against Soviet rule] should be 
carried out as a high-hearted crusade- gay, dashing, gleaming, even 
hilarious- a crusade to let in light; to let people everywhere choose how 
they wish to be governed- a crusade that stands in warm psychological 
contrast to the deadly, cold, humourless “double-speak” of the Kremlin. 
 
Such a psychological campaign run on a timetable and integrated with all departments 
of government could apparently achieve the “Collapse of the World Communist 
Movement […] World Disarmament; Inspection-with-Teeth [and] Trade with [the] 
Russians and former Satellites” by 1956.12 This was absolute fantasy. The Kersten 
Amendment and the PSB discussion neglected the fundamental necessary 
commitment of American military intervention, translating the conviction in the 
correctness of its mission into the certainty that moral justice (as it was perceived) 
would prevail.  
Paramilitary and guerrilla operations were supplemented with propaganda as the 
covert effort continued to grow. Radio was the U.S. government’s medium of choice 
for propounding its ideology and stirring up unrest in the satellites. The National 
Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) was established in June 1949, launching the 
émigré anti-communist broadcasting network Radio Free Europe (RFE). These 
organisations were ostensibly private but really received their funding from the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The avowed purpose of RFE as defined by the 
official CIA handbook issued in November 1951 was “to contribute to the liberation 
of the nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by maintaining their morale and 
stimulating in them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet dominated regimes.”13 
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The same question remained however. How could RFE and the other radio networks 
like the official Voice of America (VOA), West Berlin’s Radio in the American 
Sector (RIAS) and Radio Liberation (RL) stimulate liberation without violence? 
American propaganda called for the indigenous satellite populations to free 
themselves from communist domination without firing a shot, but this was 
implausible in a totalitarian system. Moreover, the goal of peaceful liberation was 
pursued while OPC maintained its far from peaceful paramilitary operations.  
Dissent over the misapplication of policy objectives and capabilities built up. At 
the CIA Frank Lindsay argued that the combined covert strategy of psychological and 
political warfare was insufficient to rollback totalitarian regimes in October 1952: 
The instruments currently advocated to reduce Soviet power are both 
inadequate and ineffective against the Soviet political system. The 
consolidated Communist state […] has made virtually impossible the 
existence of organized clandestine resistance capable within the 
foreseeable future of appreciably weakening the power of the state.14 
 
Moreover, in some quarters the primary long-term and intermediate objectives of US 
policy as defined by NSC 20/4 and NSC 68, and the ‘heretical communism’ agenda of 
NSC 58 were considered untenable: 
There was no evidence of progress toward the achievement of the basic 
objectives set forth in NSC 20/4, namely the reduction and retraction of 
Soviet communist power. Moreover, short term possibilities of any 
improvement in this respect appeared so slight as to be negligible.15  
 
A policy aimed both at maintaining “the hope and morale of the democratic 
majorities” while simultaneously pursuing the rise of “non-Stalinist- even though 
communist- regimes as temporary administrations” was recognised as “incompatible.” 
The validity of one of the central premises behind the encouragement of national 
communist regimes was also mooted. Would the Kremlin really react any less 
forcefully to the emergence of another Tito in the satellites, as US policy implied? 
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More likely Moscow would regard a national communist regime as threatening to its 
interests as a democratic government (Yugoslavia had received Western military aid, 
opened ties with the CIA and signed a mutual defence pact with US allies Greece and 
Turkey after all),16 and therefore respond with like force: 
Events since the winter of 1949 lead to the conclusion that USSR 
will react as strongly to the prospect of the emergence of Titoist regimes 
in the satellite nations as it will to the direct threat of the creation of non-
communist regimes. There would seem no apparent purpose to be served, 
therefore, in limiting United States policies to the promotion of schismatic 
communist regimes as an interim objective in the satellite area.17 
 
Ideological forces ruled out scaling policy down from fostering heretical communism 
to accepting the status quo. Titoism and liberation were declared unfeasible but 
activists actually called for the expansion of operations to liberate Soviet-occupied 
territory.  
The 1952 policy papers continued to reflect the strategic divisions within 
government that highlighted the inherent tensions between ideological and 
geopolitical capabilities. Consequently the NSC 135 series represented as much a 
compromise strategy as it did a clear policy formulation. This was in large part due to 
disagreements between Bohlen and Nitze in the drafting stages of the policy 
statement. Nitze had vigorously attacked Bohlen’s position as too moderate, believing 
it would abandon “any attempt now or later to roll back the Iron Curtain.” This in turn 
would obstruct US assumption of “preponderant power” from which “opportunities 
will arise for inducing or compelling a retraction of Soviet power, not of course, 
without any risk but at acceptable risk.”18 The final version, NSC 135/3, approved by 
Truman on September 25, permitted the continuation of covert operations in order to 
induce “the exploitation of rifts between the USSR and other communist states thus 
possibly offering to certain satellite peoples the prospect of liberation without war.”19 
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So long as undefined “unacceptable risks” were not entailed, “the United States 
should pursue and as practicable intensify positive political, economic, propaganda 
and paramilitary operations against the Soviet orbit.” Yet restraint and uncertainty due 
to the danger of Soviet reprisals against either the U.S. or Eastern bloc populations 
demanded that “we should not over-estimate the effectiveness of the activities we can 
pursue within the Soviet orbit,” therefore making it essential that psychological and 
political agitators “proceed with caution and a careful weighing of the risks in 
pressing upon what the Kremlin probably regards as its vital interests.”20 Deficiencies 
were also conceded with the psychological warfare campaign: 
U.S. capabilities for psychological action, within the limits of the 
world power position, are slowly but steadily improving, but they remain 
inadequate for taking immediately effective psychological action 
contributing to a retraction of the Kremlin’s power and influence.21 
 
Compromise did not resolve the contradictions at the heart of the strategy. Ideology 
was so inseparably entangled with geopolitics that it disallowed one to be abandoned 
for the other. In truth, the government reconciled the antagonisms between these two 
intertwined strands of foreign policy by accommodating them both and the strategic 
contradictions they generated. In such a way cautious and aggressive positions were 
authorised despite their mutual incompatibility.     
The Princeton conference of 10-11 May gathered together prominent members 
of the Truman administration, academics and private experts to discuss liberation 
strategy. Disagreement was again stimulated by the divergent strategic methods 
proposed by the realist camp and the ideologues in advancing the independence of 
Soviet-dominated territories. Reflecting governmental divisions, activists like Allen 
Dulles and C. D. Jackson argued for more offensive policies, emphasising the moral 
imperative of such actions. This contrasted with Bohlen’s cautious approach. He 
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maintained that liberation should remain the ultimate goal, but that geopolitical 
realities should be taken into due account and offensive strategies therefore 
considered too provocative. At the end of the conference the Princeton declaration 
announced America’s long-term commitment to Eastern Europe’s independence. It 
did not resolve whether this was possible without the adoption of a more aggressive 
policy. 
  During the 1952 presidential election campaign Truman’s containment policy, 
as it was perceived by the American public, became a central issue. Nitze remarked 
that “the evolution of our policy had outrun public understanding and support.”22 The 
American public now widely believed it to be too passive. America’s inability to 
effect democratic change in Eastern Europe was judged indicative of the 
government’s negative strategy rather than its geopolitical limitations.  
 In fact the importance of the Democratic foreign policy in shaping the 
domestic political environment had been growing steadily during the Truman 
administration’s second term. The unexpected defeat of Republican presidential 
candidate Thomas Dewey in the November 1948 elections encouraged more 
vociferous attacks by the opposition on Democratic foreign policy in a bid to gain 
maximum political advantage, terminating the post-war bipartisan approach to foreign 
relations. These attacks were heightened by the three ‘shocks’ of 1949, the Soviet 
atomic bomb, the communisation of China and also the perjury trial of former State 
Department official Alger Hiss. Each of these events, along with Hiss’s conviction 
and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, was blamed by both moderate and 
hardline Republicans on a Democratic administration that was at best naïve and at 
worst treacherous. Republican criticism linked these events to Eastern Europe by what 
it now described as earlier examples of the Democrats’ inability to run government 
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responsibly. The failure of the US to secure democracy and free elections in Eastern 
Europe, and particularly in Poland were now attributed to an appeasing and pro-
communist foreign policy that stretched back to Roosevelt’s alleged secret 
concessions made at the wartime Yalta conference.23 In the McCarthyite era of 
suspicion and allegation of Truman’s second term, several Republican congressional 
resolutions and constitutional amendments were proposed to both repudiate the Yalta 
agreements that had supposedly ‘sold out’ Eastern Europe to Stalin, and to curb 
executive authority which had allowed President Roosevelt to do so. Although none 
were actually implemented they added to the public’s sense that the government had 
lost its way in its dealings with the Soviet Union.24  
Eager to make up for lost time in the political wilderness, the Eisenhower 
campaign team seized the opportunity to criticise the Democrats’ “negative, futile and 
immoral” and “treadmill policies”25 during the 1952 campaign. Determined not to 
repeat the mistakes of 1948, the Eisenhower platform aggressively engaged in 
partisan politics by stating that it had formulated a “more dynamic foreign policy 
which, by peaceful means, will endeavour to bring about the liberation of the enslaved 
peoples” in contrast to the Democrats.26 Furthermore, the Republicans pledged “to 
wage war against secret covenants” and to “repudiate all commitments contained in 
secret understandings, such as those of Yalta, which aid Communist enslavements.”27 
Instead of criticising the flaws in Truman’s liberation strategy, John Foster Dulles 
claimed to posses a versatile alternative policy to the current one that had been 
compromised ever since Yalta, simplifying the complexities of the problem by 
ignoring the contingencies of wartime diplomacy that had shaped the conference and 
glossing over the present viability of liberation without violent confrontation. 
Liberation would “activate the strains and stresses within the Communist empire so as 
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to disintegrate it [….]” But mysteriously “[a]ctivation does not mean armed revolt. 
The people have no arms and violent revolt would be futile; indeed it would be worse 
than futile, it would precipitate massacre.”28  
 This position was inconsistent and contradictory. On the one hand Dulles 
seemed to agree with British conclusions about liberation. The Permanent Under-
Secretary’s Department (PUSD) paper “Future Policy towards Soviet Russia” of early 
1952 had set out a gradualist approach. This endorsed Bohlen’s analysis that 
“operations designed to liberate the satellites are impracticable and would involve 
unacceptable risks.” Moreover, the PUSD paper raised concerns over US policy, 
fearing that the lack of strategic clarity might result in premature uprisings in Eastern 
Europe. This would result in a further deterioration of Western interests as it would 
“inevitably lead to a strengthening of the Soviet hold over the whole of the Soviet 
empire and the liquidation of all potential supporters of the West.”29  
President Truman countered Republican attacks on containment by arguing 
that “nothing could be worse than to raise false hopes of [liberation] in Eastern 
Europe. Nothing could be worse than to incite uprisings that can only end by giving a 
new crop of victims to the Soviet executioners.”30 This overlooked the liberation 
campaign inaugurated by Truman’s own Cold War policy.  It also again raised the 
question of how to resolve the tension between aims and capabilities. Eisenhower 
limited declarations of a dynamic alternative strategy with the premise that liberation 
be accomplished peacefully because a Republican government would not wage war 
against the Kremlin to gain Eastern Europe’s independence. In such a way he never 
went to the extremes of his rival for the Republican presidential candidacy Robert 
Taft.  
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Eisenhower himself questioned Foster Dulles’s strategy during the campaign. 
Although he felt “deeply impressed” with “the directness and simplicity of your 
approach to such complex problems”, he wondered how Dulles proposed to liberate 
the satellites without provoking Soviet military intervention. Dulles admitted that 
Eisenhower had “put your finger on a weak point in my presentation”, especially 
regarding the inadequacy of “massive retaliation” in deterring Soviet political warfare. 
Although he promised to “cover it in a revision,” the fact was an election platform 
was necessarily simplistic, in contrast to the complexities of international relations. 
Neither Dulles nor Eisenhower had yet resolved the same antagonistic relationship 
between geopolitical constraint and moral aspiration that had perpetually exasperated 
the Truman administration, nor was it politically expedient to do so during the 
election. The irony was that the unresolved tensions in the Republican platform 
actually mirrored the debates within government. Dulles’s call for a more vigorous 
strategy was comparable with the aggressive facet of containment while Eisenhower’s 
desire for peaceful liberation was gravitating towards the realist position advocated by 
Bohlen and his supporters.31  
Nevertheless Eisenhower and Dulles viewed satellite independence as a 
fundamental foreign policy objective. Moscow’s domination of the region represented 
the moral dilemma raised by the spectre of the Soviet empire as well as the clear 
economic, political and military concerns invoked by the existence of a powerful 
enemy. The desire for Eastern Europe’s independence went beyond campaign rhetoric 
and the ideological commitments made by Eisenhower were not extended insincerely 
during the campaign.32 At this stage, however, Republican strategy was rhetorically-
based and superficial. The new administration would persist in advancing democracy 
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in Eastern Europe, illustrated by their persistent interest in achieving satellite 
independence once in office, but they were yet to formulate a coherent policy. 
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3 
ASSUMING THE MANTLE 
The Eisenhower Administration and Eastern Europe, 1953-
1956 
The incumbent Republican administration was partly elected on the understanding 
that it had a dynamic alternative strategy to liberate the nations of Eastern Europe. 
Several proponents of an offensive policy joined the government in top positions of 
power early in 1953. Secretary of State Foster Dulles was joined by his brother Allen as 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Other notable Cold Warriors included C. D. 
Jackson as the President’s Special Assistant for Psychological Warfare, Frank Wisner as 
director of covert operations within the CIA, and Robert Cutler, Eisenhower’s National 
Security Adviser. Despite this activist composition, the Republican campaign platform 
suggested a tension between the desire for a more decisive strategy and the practical 
restraints that had frustrated the previous administration. 
Eisenhower took his first step towards establishing policy by ordering an 
investigation, chaired by William H. Jackson, into American “information policies” on 
January 24, 1953.1 The Jackson Committee issued its conclusions on June 30, yet despite 
acknowledging that there “seems to be a large measure of agreement that we lack an 
adequate national grand strategy and that something other than the present policy is 
needed”2 it failed to address the inherent contradictions within existing policy. The 
previous administration was criticised for failing “to define its specific goals clearly and 
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precisely” and for promoting “unrealizable goals arousing excessive hopes in the satellite 
countries or elsewhere.”3 Psychological warfare operations had made “very little 
progress” and “must be considered unsuccessful to date.” Despite questioning “whether 
they should be modified or abandoned” the study failed to assert a clear resolution.4 
Instead the Jackson Committee made a scapegoat of the PSB, falsely accusing the 
department of separating psychological warfare from the other divisions of government. 
An interdepartmental Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was established in its place 
to plan psychological warfare for the NSC, while the United States Information Agency 
(USIA) was formed to conduct ‘information’ operations. This did not resolve the real 
problem that psychological warfare was actually too entangled with geopolitical factors, 
resulting in the pursuit of contradictory policy objectives. On the contrary, it maintained 
that operations should strive towards doing “everything possible to aggravate internal 
conflicts in the hope that this will subsequently help to bring about a retraction of 
Kremlin control and influence.” Still left unresolved was how, after U.S. broadcasts had 
stirred up the desire for independence in the region, liberation would be achieved without 
either violent indigenous revolt or direct American military intervention.  
The report recommended that the primary means of psychological warfare should 
be the ostensibly private psychological warfare channel NCFE: 
Far greater effort should be made to utilize private American organizations 
for the advancement of US objectives. The gain in dissemination and 
credibility through the use of such channels will more than offset the loss by 
the Government of some control over the content.5 
 
Surprisingly, the explicit understanding that engaging the state-private network would 
lead to governmental loss of control over the implementation of its policy was accepted. 
Instead of imposing strict operational control over the psychological warfare campaign to 
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insure its adherence to Washington’s policy, radio broadcasters in the field would be 
relatively unrestrained. The ramifications of stimulating unrest through excessively 
provocative propaganda with the émigré networks were deemed less important than the 
advantages that could be gained from such autonomous operations. The intensification of 
propaganda was an inauspicious development while Washington rejected pledging the 
necessary military commitment to support rebellions once they had been stirred up.  
 Emphasis on the psychological campaign did not divert the Eisenhower 
administration away from political warfare. OPC continued to conduct paramilitary 
operations behind the Iron Curtain while Washington found its feet. Despite SIS’s 
abandonment of the Albanian operation following persistent operational failures in 1950, 
OPC continued to believe that it represented the most vulnerable of the satellites and the 
most likely regime to be prised away from Moscow’s authority. In 1953 political warfare 
still enjoyed generous financial backing with about half of the CIA’s $100 million budget 
allocated to paramilitary training and operations.6  
 The NSC signalled an early intention to adopt a more offensive strategy. On 
February 19 the creation of a Volunteer Freedom Corps (VFC) was discussed. The idea 
of establishing émigré battalions under US military command, resurrecting the Kersten 
Amendment initiative, gained popularity because it offered a cheaper alternative to 
training US combat soldiers. Deploying émigré rather than American troops to fight local 
wars in the American interest was also appealing. But the JCS, apprehensive about 
reallocating vital resources, opposed the VFC suggesting that “more good will be 
accomplished […] by allowing the Kersten Amendment to lapse or at the most leaving it 
on the books with no actual implementation.”7  
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Other concerns were raised over the US Government publicly and provocatively 
endorsing liberation. Charles Bohlen stated his disagreement at a Jackson Committee 
hearing: 
We all want to see Eastern Europe free. There is no difference of opinion on 
this. There is a difference of opinion, however, as to the wisdom of 
proclaiming this as a national objective. If we make such a proclamation we 
are in a real sense committing ourselves to bring it about. This is a 
responsibility which a truly great power accepts when it speaks. At some 
point the commitment to such an objective may come into conflict with some 
other commitment; for example, we do not intend to start a world war and this 
goal may conflict with the goal of liberation for Eastern Europe.8 
 
As observed by Bohlen, US government actions could not be separated from the 
international perception of their symbolic meaning. Thus the establishment of émigré 
battalions was a simultaneous endorsement of their primary objective, the liberation of 
Eastern Europe. Bohlen’s warning that the VFC might provoke a war the US was not 
committed to fight went unheeded. Despite the reservations it was established in May 
1953 under the authority of NSC 143/2, although its implementation was continually 
delayed for fear of prejudicing passage of the European Defence Community (EDC).9  
Dulles and Eisenhower also appeared to be reneging on their campaign promise to 
repudiate the Yalta agreements, curb executive authority and impose a bold new foreign 
policy to liberate the Soviet satellites. The administration’s congressional resolution on 
Yalta introduced by Republican Congressman John Vorys in February 1953 frustrated the 
right wing of the party. This was precisely because it did not repudiate the wartime 
agreements but rather criticised Soviet violations of the “clear intent” of the “Declaration 
of Liberated Europe” in order “to bring about the subjugation of free peoples.”10 Rather 
than face infighting between the administration and the extreme wing of the party Robert 
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Taft killed off the resolution in committee on March 10 1953, thereby saving the blushes 
of Eisenhower and Dulles.11  
The Bricker Amendment, introduced on January 7 1953 and proposing to limit the 
use of executive authority in foreign policy by requiring congressional ratification of all 
executive agreements and treaties affecting domestic politics met with a similar fate. The 
Eisenhower administration circumvented the dilemma of directly opposing another 
initiative it had supported during the election campaign by attaching an amendment to it 
that was defeated in February 1954.12 The exigencies of incumbency had overruled any 
notions of fulfilling campaign bluster. Ultimately the VFC was only a symbolic gesture 
of US opposition to Soviet domination and the Vorys resolution and Bricker Amendment 
had been defeated because of the real detrimental impact they would have had on the 
administration’s operation of foreign affairs. In any case, several momentous events 
shook the Soviet bloc providing rare opportunities of Russian vulnerability for 
Eisenhower and Dulles to exploit to make good their campaign pledges of liberation. 
The first opportunity was Stalin’s death on March 5. Instead of acting decisively on 
this unique occasion against a vulnerable Soviet leadership engaged in a secession 
struggle, US strategists actually became paralysed by bureaucratic division.13 Eisenhower 
himself lamented over the lack of a clear strategy: 
Ever since 1946, I know that all the so-called experts have been 
yapping about what would happen when Stalin dies and what we as a nation, 
should do about it. Well, he’s dead. And you can turn the files of our 
government inside out- in vain- looking for any plans laid. We have no plan. 
We are not even sure what difference his death makes.14   
 
In fact, contingency guidance under PSB D-24 “Program of Psychological Preparation 
for Stalin’s Passing from Power” had been drafted under Truman.15 The real problem 
 50
was that implementing an aggressive policy was inherently provocative even at this 
unique moment, making it unpopular with many key figures. Policy decision was blocked 
by the State Department where Foster Dulles now recognised practical geopolitical 
restraints and urged a cautious response to avoid aggravating a sensitive situation. 
Conversely, PSB D-24 and other offensive psychological-warfare measures were 
advocated by C. D. Jackson, Harold Stassen, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), plus 
prominent private advisers like Walt Rostow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT). The conflict of opinion reflecting the tension between a restrained and a 
belligerent strategy could not be resolved so Eisenhower adopted a wait-and-see attitude. 
 The cautious US response in the immediate aftermath of Stalin’s death illustrated 
the preference for restraint germinating in the State Department in the first months of the 
new administration.16 In contrast to C. D. Jackson and Rostow who hastily began 
drawing up offensive psychological warfare strategies to exploit the sudden weakness at 
the heart of Soviet power, State was unwilling to endorse provocative operations to probe 
Moscow’s vulnerabilities.17  The underlying ideological goal of liberation had not been 
abandoned, but the State Department believed that in the short-term, aggressive 
psychological and political warfare could prove too provocative in the unpredictable new 
climate.  
Administrative indecision resulted in Eisenhower’s official response to Stalin’s 
death being made six weeks and twelve drafts later.18 Eisenhower’s “Chance for Peace” 
speech exacerbated bureaucratic indecision by adopting a middle road between 
reconciliation and an offensive position. Instead of a genuine effort to negotiate with the 
new Soviet leadership, “Chance for Peace” was more a psychological warfare initiative to 
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win over international opinion. Eisenhower and Dulles were extremely sceptical about 
Georgii Malenkov’s “peace initiative” initiated at Stalin’s funeral, interpreting any 
reconciliatory Soviet overtures as part of a strategy to scupper Western military 
integration.19 Eisenhower undermined his “serious bid for peace” by attempting to win a 
propaganda victory rather than open a dialogue, demonstrated by the conditions he 
attached as prerequisites to negotiation and the massive level of global distribution the 
speech received.20  
The administration rejected pursuing serious discussions on the status of Eastern 
Europe, something Bohlen later regretted.21 Even if Moscow had accepted American 
demands Washington would have considered any concessions made spoiling tactics.22  
As Eisenhower had also supported State’s blocking of an alternative covert offensive the 
eventual strategy epitomised an ineffective compromise between these extremes. 
Liberation in the long-term was not ruled out, and rather than negotiate with Malenkov 
and raise the possibility of detente, Eisenhower preferred the route of Western integration 
and the rearmament of West Germany.23 The decision to link political concessions with 
disarmament negotiations that it knew the Soviets would reject reflected the 
government’s desire to bring about the liberation of Eastern Europe before talks could 
begin.24 Secretary Dulles, who had opposed “Chance for Peace” all along, immediately 
hardened the US position after Eisenhower’s address by publicly demanding that the 
Kremlin relinquish its control of the satellites. The new administration was committed to 
the ideological war, refusing to accept Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence.  
American behaviour adversely affected the possibility of any modification in the 
Soviet position. Growing Western military strength and the rearmament of West 
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Germany represented a threat not only to Soviet control over its satellites but to Russian 
security itself. The US decision to rearm and militarily integrate the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) enhanced Soviet security interests in the region as a buffer against 
Western attack, resulting in both a hardening of Moscow’s diplomatic position and 
further consolidation of satellite authority. This in turn perpetuated Washington’s 
determination to strengthen the West’s armed forces as a counter-balance to Soviet bloc 
power. The escalatory effect of this strategy culminated in Moscow’s creation of the 
Warsaw Pact in May 1955 as a military counterweight to NATO.25  
If Stalin’s death came too soon in the incumbency for Eisenhower to adopt a 
coherent strategy, the autocrat’s demise generated another opportunity several months 
later. Late in May unrest broke out behind the Iron Curtain in Bulgaria and 
Czechoslovakia and then more significantly in East Germany in June following 
Malenkov’s conciliatory messages implying greater independence from Moscow. As riots 
broke out in East Berlin RIAS fanned the flames of discontent, influencing the spread of 
unrest to the rest of East Germany.26 The consequences of the operational autonomy 
endorsed by the Jackson Committee were playing themselves out. US propaganda could 
effectively spread discontent through the satellite populations, but it needed the support 
of a resolute government stance to induce any Soviet shift towards the withdrawal of 
troops that was implicit in peaceful liberation. 
Yet again Washington was divided as how best to respond. Even if a swift US 
response was hindered by a lack of intelligence in the Soviet zone, procrastination was 
due to the policy vacuum that reflected its unpreparedness.27 Indecision reflected the 
administration’s desire to exploit the situation without the knowledge or plan of how to 
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do so. Supporters of an offensive response including the arming of insurgents were 
immediately shackled. The president unrealistically hoped that riots in the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) would spread to China, and even then only a limited US 
response in supplying arms would be considered. Limited US intervention of this sort 
would only occur if the revolt was deemed to have “a real chance of success” (which the 
East Berlin uprising was not considered to have), highlighting that beyond rhetoric the 
satellite populations were on their own in physically achieving liberation.28 This, of 
course, diminished their actual chances of success. 
The strategy finally adopted once the revolt had been crushed by Soviet troops 
involving food kitchens in West Berlin for the GDR’s hungry in no way promoted the 
ultimate objective of East European independence. Eisenhower and Dulles had acted 
according to the limitations of their geopolitical power and the food aid program 
embodied a face-saving exercise for American prestige and an effort to enhance 
Chancellor Adenauer’s campaign in the September elections in the FRG.  
Interim policy was drawn up in NSC 158 a week after the riots. Despite the 
disastrous consequences of US involvement in the violence through its broadcasts NSC 
158 continued to promote American backing of indigenous resistance to Soviet authority, 
though with the caveat that “more emphasis be placed on passive resistance.” The interim 
paper left undefined how it proposed to “nourish resistance to communist oppression 
throughout satellite Europe, short of mass rebellion.”29 The only feasible means of 
achieving liberation without direct American military assistance was mass rebellion. 
Despite the bloody evidence on the streets of East Berlin nullifying the viability of either 
 54
peaceful or violent indigenous liberation, Washington still refused to abandon its 
ideological agenda.  
Foster Dulles received overwhelming criticism of covert warfare in response to 
the riots from ambassadors and senior diplomats at the State Department. In contrast to 
the Jackson Committee, State supported the strict control and review of psychological 
warfare: 
Our psychological warfare effort should never be allowed to run ahead of 
carefully considered political objectives as there is always the danger if this is 
allowed to happen that psychological warfare can start to make policy rather 
than serve it.30 
 
The impact of American, let alone émigré propaganda broadcasts behind the Iron Curtain 
as illustrated by the diffusion of unrest in the GDR made this imperative if US policy was 
merely to encourage peaceful resistance and await a Soviet military withdrawal. Where 
the PSB implied that political warfare was an effective medium as the uprising had 
“created the greatest opportunity for initiating effective policies to help roll back Soviet 
power that has yet come to light,” State recognised America’s very limited geopolitical 
influence short of war.31 Covert warfare not only alienated Washington from its Western 
European allies, it also hindered the probability of stimulating a Soviet troop withdrawal 
that Moscow “will probably eventually consider.” Most importantly, the US “should 
never consider that Eastern Europe can be liberated by political warfare devices no matter 
how well planned and energetic they may be.” The covert campaign should accordingly 
be strictly limited to “assist in this spirit [of resistance] but should never incite [the 
satellites] to rebellion or revolts.” Although State’s response to the East German uprising 
proposed scaling down political warfare, it did not recommend its termination.32 The 
tension still unresolved was that the revolt had graphically demonstrated that covert 
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warfare could not tread the fine line between fostering passive resistance and inciting 
rebellion. Psychological and political warfare operations were by their very nature 
provocative and the uprising illustrated Washington’s inability to control unrest once it 
had had been generated. 
The Solarium policy review that dominated the summer months and its 
culmination in NSC 162 also failed to address US liberation strategy and objectives. 
Approved by Eisenhower in October, his administration’s “Basic National Security 
Strategy” was drafted in light of the inevitable Soviet development of the hydrogen 
bomb. It therefore emphasised defensive aspects of foreign policy like “massive nuclear 
deterrence” and “collective security” rather than the offensive political warfare 
campaign.33 Begun in May, Project Solarium had been divided into Task Forces A, B and 
C to study three alternative approaches to national security ranging from traditional 
concepts of containment to more aggressive rollback operations. Disagreement over the 
alternative strategies could not be reconciled leading Eisenhower characteristically to 
compromise and not explicitly rule out one approach for the other.34  
Though NSC 162/2 failed to impose a clear and unified strategy, it did mark a 
shift from rollback and the ideological fervour that had punctuated NSC 68. It sanctioned 
taking “feasible political, economic, propaganda and covert measures to create and 
exploit troublesome problems for the USSR […], complicate control in the satellites, and 
retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc,” yet it also 
stated that US policy was not designed “to dictate the internal political and economic 
organization of the USSR.”35 Strategic contradiction was maintained, however, because a 
caveat designated that “this paragraph does not establish policy guidance for our 
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propaganda or informational activities.”36 Here was the loophole allowing psychological 
warfare to continue. Moreover, the JCS still favoured a “positive, dynamic policy” and 
having gained Eisenhower’s concurrence a paragraph written by the State Department 
prohibiting the US from “initiat[ing] aggressive actions involving force against Soviet 
bloc territory” was omitted from the final document.37 Despite recognising that the 
“detachment of any major European satellite from the Soviet bloc does not now appear 
feasible except by Soviet acquiescence or by war,” NSC 162/2 permitted psychological 
and political warfare operations to continue in the false hope that they could achieve 
exactly that- satellite independence with or without Soviet consent and certainly without 
war.38   
American and émigré anti-communist propaganda outlets continued to expand 
operations after the completion of NSC 162/2. RFE unleashed two waves of 
psychological warfare through intensive broadcasting and leaflet drops haranguing the 
Czech leadership under operations “Prospero” and “VETO” in 1953. The next year 
Hungary was targeted by “Operation FOCUS” which demanded economic reforms and 
democratic elections from the regime. New and more powerful transmitters were added to 
enhance the campaigns. By 1954 RFE was broadcasting anti-communist propaganda 
almost twenty four hours a day with a burgeoning staff of operators and informants. 
In addition, the OCB continued to plan for liberation. The draft policy paper OCB 
16 “National Operations Plan-USSR and European Satellites” of November 1953 
suggested that at the very least its author C. D. Jackson did not understand that basic U.S. 
policy was now containment and not rollback. Robert Cutler wrote of the still classified 
document that many aspects in it were “in conflict with policy […] were unclear as to 
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whether or not they conformed to existing policy […] or which seemed to venture into 
fields where there was no existing policy.”39  
 This confusion should have been resolved by NSC 174 “US Policy toward the 
Soviet Satellites”, the policy paper specific to Eastern Europe superseding the interim 
NSC 158. Responding to the East German uprising, NSC 174 reiterated the unlikelihood 
of a satellite breaking with the Soviet bloc without Moscow’s approval or war, as asserted 
in NSC 162/2. Military intervention was categorically dismissed: 
A deliberate policy of attempting to liberate the satellite peoples by military 
force, which would probably mean war with the USSR and most probably 
would be unacceptable to the American people and condemned by world 
opinion, cannot be given serious consideration. 
 
Instead diplomatic, economic, propaganda and covert pressure would be brought to bear 
“to maintain the morale of anti-Soviet elements, to sow confusion and discredit the 
authority of the regimes, to disrupt Soviet-satellite relationships, and generally to 
maximise Soviet difficulties.” How Washington proposed to gain the “eventual 
elimination” of Soviet control peacefully remained murky, as did its plan to incite 
satellite resistance without provoking violence:  
In its efforts to encourage anti-Soviet elements in the satellites and 
keep up their hopes, the United States should not encourage premature action 
on their part which will bring upon them further terror and suppression. 
Continuing and careful attention must be given to the fine line, which is not 
stationary, between exhortations to keep up morale and to maintain passive 
resistance, and invitations to suicide.  
 
The US had already failed to walk the tight rope during the summer of violence in the 
GDR. The lessons from that experience had not been learned because the administration’s 
determination to win the long-term ideological war endured. Instead of directing policy 
towards avoiding a repeat of that revolt, the government would prepare “to exploit any 
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further disturbances similar to the East German riots” while conversely refusing to 
support any “premature” revolts deemed unlikely to succeed. NSC 174 settled for a 
“middle course” between war and dropping its liberation aspirations which sounded 
prudent. In fact it disguised the perpetuation of tensions that ultimately left policy 
dependant on a Soviet willingness to withdraw its troops and satellite prudence in seeking 
independence.40 
 Washington also reviewed another of its middle course alternatives, the “heretical 
communism” strategy. NSC 174 distanced itself from NSC 58/2 by stating that it was 
extremely unlikely that a “satellite communist regime would or could break away from 
Moscow under its own power.”41 But two months later policy guidance specific to 
Yugoslavia stipulated that “[p]olitically and psychologically, the “Tito heresy” has 
provided the West with an important asset.” Although the evidence refuted that another 
Tito would emerge to defy Moscow and align with the West, and despite the fundamental 
ideological differences between the American and Yugoslav regimes, NSC 5406/1 
concluded that it was still “in the security interest of the United States to support 
Yugoslavia.” Accordingly, US policy reconciled to pursue a contradictory policy. 
Washington aimed to engineer the “[e]ventual fulfilment of the Yugoslav people to live 
under a government of their own choosing” while its simultaneous short-term objective to 
avoid actions “which would undermine that regime” was wholly incompatible with this: 
Avoiding antagonizing the Tito regime to the point of jeopardizing realization 
of our immediate objectives or inducing political aspirations among the 
Yugoslav peoples likely to produce disorder or unrest.42 
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Judgement was again complicated by inherent ideological ambitions in concluding that a 
policy could juggle the short–term support for a regime while pursuing its collapse in the 
long-term.  
Tito still represented an alternative model to the Kremlin-dominated satellite 
regimes in the eyes of the US, despite the clear tension with Washington’s long-term 
goals. Strategic complications were compounded by the normalising of relations between 
Moscow and Belgrade beginning in August 1954 and reinforced by the “different roads to 
socialism” declaration of June the following year. Tito’s usefulness as a Western asset in 
fostering satellite dissension would decrease exponentially with Belgrade’s closer ties to 
the Kremlin. Yet Dulles and Eisenhower continued to assert their faith in retaining good 
relations with the dictator, and persevered to persuade Congress to allow American 
supplies of military aid to Yugoslavia to persist. 
The promotion of national communism illustrated a significant shift occurring in 
the State Department where Foster Dulles was re-evaluating satellite independence 
according to its geopolitical importance. In light of the probable Soviet acquisition of 
thermo-nuclear weapons plus the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) delivery 
systems that made the continental US vulnerable to non-conventional attack, Dulles 
assessed that the security risks inherent with the liberation of Eastern Europe no longer 
outweighed the ideological benefits:  
[Liberation] in itself would not touch the heart of the problem: Soviet atomic 
plenty [….] [E]ven if we split the Soviet bloc, in other words, we would still 
have to face the terrible problem and threat of an unimpaired nuclear 
capability in the USSR itself.43 
 
The basic goal of democratic change remained, but its strategic value against the 
backdrop of non-conventional war had become peripheral, determining that the US 
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“should forego actions which would generally be regarded as provocative.”44 As a result, 
paramilitary operations were increasingly wound down and greater emphasis was placed 
on what Washington considered the less controversial psychological warfare campaign of 
its propaganda networks. The need to avoid provoking Moscow into retaliatory action 
that could set off a chain of events escalating into general war, and not the expectation 
that liberation was more likely to occur, determined this shift in State’s outlook.  
Conflicting short-term and long-term objectives, now balanced with a drastically 
enhanced security threat, undermined any chance of the administration formulating a 
coherent and authoritative strategy. During 1954 and 1955 the government continued in 
its efforts to reconcile divergent policy interests into an overall compromise strategy that 
maintained the liberation of Eastern Europe as its ultimate goal but with a clear short-
term shift in emphasis towards containment and co-existence. Malenkov’s approaches to 
open a serious dialogue with the US further pacified the belligerent edges of policy. The 
result was a strategy riddled with contradictions, which the NSC itself observed to some 
extent. A progress report on NSC 174 in July 1954 noted that “effective implementation 
of certain of the courses of action […] is inhibited by the cautions and limitations written 
into that document.” It went on to acknowledge the tensions impairing effective strategy: 
There are policy problems, for example, the objective is to restore 
freedom and roll back Soviet power in the satellites, but at the same time to 
avoid provoking war with the USSR, to ease international tensions, cooperate 
with our allies and avoid premature revolt.45 
 
Despite the contradictions at the operational level the US was mobilised to conduct 
a vigorous covert campaign to liberate Eastern Europe.46 Washington could not bring 
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itself to abandon its aspirations. Instead and despite all the estimates, the administration 
hoped a Soviet withdrawal might occur: 
Although the time for a significant rollback of Soviet power may appear to be 
in the future, the U.S. should be prepared, by feasible current actions or future 
planning, to take advantage of any earlier opportunity to contract Communist-
controlled areas and power.47 
 
Yet “feasible” courses of action were rapidly diminishing. The US had been unable to 
liberate Eastern Europe in the late 1940s when Soviet power was still being consolidated 
and the threat to US security had allowed much more vigorous operations to be 
conducted against the satellite regimes. Notwithstanding the enhanced Soviet threat and 
consequent US determination to avoid war, the residual ideological strain that had 
remained constant since the war ensured that psychological warfare operations would 
continue. Paradoxically the administrative estimated that the scale of covert operations 
required to achieve liberation would, in fact, provoke the war it was avoiding at all costs: 
To be an effective contribution toward detachment, such covert support 
would need to be on a large scale [….] From a practical standpoint, it is 
doubtful; whether […] support on the necessary scale could long be continued 
on a covert basis without precipitating strong retaliatory action which in turn 
would require [US] intervention […] if the resistance elements were to be 
saved from annihilation. Large-scale covert support of resistance elements in 
these countries is probably tantamount to open hostilities.48  
 
Superficially the NSC resolved the policy dilemma through another rhetorical shift 
from an offensive position. In January 1955 it issued a revised policy paper superseding 
NSC 162/2 and NSC 5422/2 that returned to Bohlen’s concept of coexistence. NSC 
5505/1 trumpeted the objective of “evolutionary rather than revolutionary change” in the 
satellites. Emphasis was to be placed on Western unity rather than divisive unilateralist 
operations against the satellites: “It is to be emphasized that no political warfare strategy 
can in any sense substitute for adequate military, political, and economic programs 
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designed to strengthen the free world.” Yet the shift in language did not represent a 
modification of the fundamental tension. The US still hoped to “foster changes in the 
character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regimes.” Washington’s ability to 
influence evolutionary change was as fictional short of war as revolutionary change, 
while the region remained a Soviet geopolitical priority. A strategy promoting passive 
resistance on the part of the satellite populations placed the burden of liberation entirely 
on an American military intervention or unforeseen Soviet acquiescence. In fact NSC 
5505/1 was not laying liberation to rest, calling for “a flexible combination of military, 
political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions" in implementing “anti-regime 
measures.”49 While Soviet garrisons remained and American propaganda incited anti-
communist sentiment, policy teetered on a tightrope between ineffectiveness and disaster.  
There were other indications that Washington had not actually dropped liberation. 
The Doolittle Committee Report investigating CIA covert operations called for “an 
aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more effective, 
more unique and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy.” 
Shunning the reconciliatory line propounding peaceful coexistence with the Soviet bloc, 
the study reverted to the ideological belligerency of NSC 20/4 and NSC 68, demanding 
that the US ultimately defeat its “implacable enemy.”50  
The Secretary of State and DCI Dulles emphasised that they too had not abandoned 
the goal of liberation. Although a duel strategy pursuing violent and non-violent 
modification of the satellite regimes was contradictory, they “did not wish the guidance 
provided by NSC 5505, on the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities along evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary lines, to destroy all possibility of seizing opportunities for 
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exploiting a different type of strategy if such opportunities clearly presented themselves.” 
Cutler informed them that NSC 5505/1 did not exclude this alternative.51 Yet such an 
opportunity had already presented itself in East Berlin and geopolitical factors had 
prevented the government from intervening because of the strong likelihood of provoking 
a full-scale conflict with Moscow. Since then the determination to avoid war had risen, 
further undermining the possibility of constructing a coherent plan should another revolt 
flare up. Washington had itself recognised its inability to respond any differently should 
another revolt like the East German uprising occur in a satellite.52 The unspoken 
conviction that the moral principle of democracy transcended geopolitical factors 
preserved the goal of liberation in the background.  
 Eisenhower was still enamoured with the VFC initiative, illustrating the 
contradiction in approach that reflected his desire to settle for nothing less than liberation. 
In August 1955 he attempted (and failed) to win the West German government’s support 
for VCF to “provide a cadre of trained personnel to form and control to U.S. advantage 
any large numbers of defected Soviet Orbit personnel in the event of war.”53 This was 
consistent with OCB’s recommendation that the VFC finally be established.54 
Eisenhower and Dulles’s perception of the new “evolutionary” policy represented a shift 
in language and not the rejection of the ultimate objective. They still pursued the eventual 
overthrow of the communist authorities in Eastern Europe, and the modification towards 
greater Satellite domestic autonomy represented merely another interim objective.  
Dulles took new heart from the rhetorical shift, believing that his moralistic agenda 
was closer to realisation. Détente with the USSR presented “a real opportunity in the 
present situation for a rollback of Soviet power. Such a rollback might leave the present 
 64
satellite states in a status not unlike that of Finland.”55 Yet despite his new-found 
enthusiasm Dulles failed to place the status of Eastern Europe on the agenda at the 
Geneva Conference in July.56 Without recourse to war, the only realistic alternative to 
achieve a Soviet withdrawal was to negotiate with the Kremlin. The US administration 
remained dismissive of this alternative, focussing instead on its primary geopolitical 
interests at Geneva like Korea, Indochina, Germany and Austria.. 
As the Eisenhower administration entered a presidential election year it had been 
found sorely lacking in one of its most trumpeted platform strategies. Yet a lack of public 
awareness had not compelled the government to fundamentally alter its policy. Contrary 
to the public perception of a new cordial international climate following the Austrian 
State Treaty, the Belgrade Pact and the Geneva Conference, liberation remained a distant 
goal and the bureaucratic apparatus supporting political and psychological warfare was 
renewed in December 1955.57 Whether Eisenhower’s inconsistent policy would now 
adapt to the climate of ‘co-existence’ and abandon, once and for all, its ideological 
agenda for Eastern Europe was yet to be truly tested. 
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4 
YEAR OF UPHEAVAL 
1956: Contradiction, Impotence and Revolution 
The Eisenhower Government entered its re-election year still unable to 
disentangle ideological ambitions for Eastern Europe from its geopolitical and military 
limitations in the region. The administration was still enamoured with projecting the 
wartime principles of democracy and a capitalist economic system on the Soviet-
controlled bloc, but shifting political-strategic considerations had modified the policy-
level approach that it was hoped could achieve liberation. The Soviet acquirement of the 
hydrogen bomb had enhanced its power to the extent that the lynchpin of US security 
policy was now to avoid a third world war at all costs. This imperative was in direct 
tension with Washington’s continuing aspiration to liberate the satellites, especially 
because the psychological and political warfare methods it utilised were necessarily 
provocative. It also wrangled strategists more generally because the US remained 
ideologically at war with what it deemed the immoral communist bloc led by Moscow. 
This negated any serious consideration of pursuing negotiations to alleviate a 
fundamental source of ideological tension represented by Eastern Europe’s status. 
Despite the so called emergence of détente with the “spirit of Geneva” the US 
concentrated on negotiating over the sources of tension that transcended its fundamental 
ideological and geopolitical interests, primarily the status of Germany.  
In early 1956 the administration continued to come up against the contradictions 
between its ideological goals and geopolitical power. A National Intelligence Estimate 
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(NIE) in January recognised that the “military, political, and economic significance of the 
Satellites to the USSR is so great that Moscow almost certainly regards the maintenance 
of control over the area as an essential element of its power position.”1 For the US to 
alter the status of Eastern Europe would therefore require war if its ideological objective 
remained true. The OCB observed the following month that public announcements by 
Eisenhower and Dulles did indeed reiterate this ideological aim: 
[T]he U.S. intention [is] not to undertake any agreement which would have 
the effect of confirming the status quo in the satellite area and […] it [is] the 
aim of U.S. policy that the satellite peoples should eventually obtain their 
independence and the right to determine freely their own form of government. 
 
The progress report also surmised that “U.S. capabilities […] which could basically alter 
the status of the satellites, remain limited” because the option of resorting to military 
conflict had been rejected. Although recognising that covert warfare “intended to 
encourage anti-communist activities and passive resistance are somewhat incompatible 
with a détente [and] evolutionary changes in satellite regimes” the report concluded that 
Washington would have to live with these inconsistencies, rather than abandon one 
strategy for the other: “It may be that the U.S. will have to undertake to follow 
simultaneously two policies with inconsistent courses of action, representing divergent 
approaches to the one objective.”2 
On February 25 Nikita Krushchev made his landmark speech to the Twentieth 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) denouncing the cult of 
personality that had surrounded Stalin allowing him to abuse his power. When 
Washington learned of Khrushchev’s call for de-Stalinisation and liberalisation of the 
Soviet system, along with the replacement of the hard-line Foreign Minister Vyacheslav 
Molotov, policy-makers immediately debated how best to exploit this rare example of the 
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Kremlin admitting its own fallibility. On the one hand restraint was necessary to not 
disturb the climate of relatively good relations with Moscow. The thaw in relations 
appeared to be paying dividends in light of the Khrushchev speech. But Washington 
interpreted Khrushchev’s calls for reform in the Soviet-satellite relationship as 
symbolising a potential weakness in the Kremlin’s geopolitical position, offering new 
opportunities to accelerate Eastern Europe’s independence. While reviewing the text for 
the NSC on March 22, Allen Dulles asserted that Khrushchev’s deliberate attempt to 
attack Stalin “afforded the United States a great opportunity, both covertly and overtly, to 
exploit the situation to its advantage.”3 Yet the requisite intensification of psychological 
and political warfare operations pursuant to this objective clashed with détente.  
Eisenhower opted for the aggressive psychological exploitation of the ‘secret’ 
speech, endorsing its publication in the New York Times on June 4, but more importantly 
its wide dissemination into Eastern Europe through the NCFE propaganda channels to 
foster anti-Soviet and nationalist unrest. Foster Dulles enthused to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee that Khrushchev was “on the ropes and, if we can keep the pressure 
up […] there is going to occur a very great disintegration within the apparatus of the 
international communist organization.”4 Although this “pressure” clearly contradicted 
with US efforts to foster peaceful change and the encouragement of Soviet concessions at 
the negotiating table, bureaucratic opposition to the speech’s release surfaced for quite 
another reason. Frank Wisner and James Jesus Angleton at the CIA requested that the 
administration defer publishing Khrushchev’s speech because of the lack of preparedness 
of the Agency’s Operation Red Sox/ Red Cap.5 Rather than seeking “evolutionary change 
in the Soviet system” as was the definition of US strategy in NSC 5602/1 of March 15, 
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the CIA hoped to augment its émigré paramilitary campaign to foment anti-communist 
uprisings through the timely circulation of the speech.6 
The revolt by workers at the locomotive plant in Poznań in Poland on June 28 
should have reminded the administration why it had (supposedly) modified its strategy 
towards peaceful change rather than the fostering of anti-Soviet rebellion. Washington 
was implicitly involved because of NCFE’s dissemination of Khrushchev’s speech 
throughout Poland, promoting anti-Soviet feeling which then turned violent in Poznań. 
As with East Germany in 1953, the US Government was powerless to influence events on 
the ground in Poland if it was not prepared to militarily intervene on the side of the rioters 
against the communist authorities. As had been the case three years before, having 
implicitly encouraged dissent the unrest was quickly quelled and Eisenhower and Dulles 
could only fall back on mild protestation in response.  
The failure to resolve strategic inconsistency was exacerbated because 
Washington viewed evolutionary change as simply a shift in policy still seeking the 
ultimate aim of satellite liberation, rather than the abandonment of this aim for Soviet 
modification. As a result, ideological interests were still very much enmeshed with 
geopolitical constraints. The policy review series NSC 5608 issued over the summer in 
light of the ostensible shift to “evolutionary change” and the Poznań riots failed to 
resolve the strategic problem created by the tension between ideology and geopolitics. 
But this was in contrast to the administration’s understanding of the new policy 
documentation. State believed that NSC 5608 had “redefined the general courses of 
action to bring them into conformity with the present situation in Eastern Europe and 
with a more realistic assessment of US capabilities to effect developments in that area.”7 
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In fact the strategy paper represented only a rhetorical shift from the pursuit of the 
revolutionary overthrow of Moscow’s hegemony to the “encouragement of evolutionary 
change resulting in the weakening of Soviet controls and the attainment of national 
independence by the countries concerned, even though there may be no immediate 
change in their internal political structure.”8 Despite the symbolic shift, the ideological 
imperative of liberating Eastern Europe remained fundamental. This could still be 
achieved by stimulating indigenous rebellion on the condition that it stood a good chance 
of success in overthrowing the communist authorities: “Avoid incitements to violence or 
to action when the probable reprisals or other results would yield a net loss in terms of 
U.S. objectives.”9 No indication of how Washington proposed to walk this fine line 
between promoting successful revolutions and discouraging “premature” revolts was 
suggested. Vice President Richard Nixon’s explanation was semantically as clear as mud: 
We are not saying that we are going to initiate uprisings and violence in the 
satellites. We are merely saying that we will not always discourage such 
uprisings and violence if the uprisings should occur spontaneously. The 
policy paper […] should not be too ‘soft’ in character.10  
 
At the operational level political and psychological warfare was being intensified 
rather than wound down because Washington believed that Moscow’s grip on its 
satellites was slipping. Cracks were perceived in the Kremlin’s armour both practically 
with its liberalising reforms, and symbolically with the acceptance of Tito and the 
“different roads to socialism” thesis plus Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin. Although 
the NSC 5608 series remained pessimistic of the chances of success of any satellites 
breaking away from Moscow as illustrated by Poznań, the “fluid situation in the satellites 
has increased the previously limited U.S. capabilities to influence a basic change in 
Soviet domination of the satellites.”11 The desire to accelerate the process of 
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“evolutionary change” resulted in the US intensifying its revolutionary covert operations, 
implicitly encouraged by the policy paper despite the overall emphasis on peaceful 
means: 
There is a possibility that an internal relaxation might result in the long run in 
the development of forces and pressures leading to fundamental changes of 
the satellite system in the direction of national independence and individual 
freedom and security.12 
 
Consequently rhetoric papered over the cracks of contradictory strategies and covert 
warfare was allowed to continue at the operational level. 
 Washington interpreted the events of the “Polish October” as vindicating the new 
policy approach with its emphasis on evolutionary change while continuing to stir up 
unrest in the satellites to maximise strains in the leadership. Despite the emergency visit 
of the Khrushchev delegation on October 19 and intimidating Soviet troop manoeuvres 
towards Warsaw in response to signs that the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) was 
on the verge of undertaking autonomous reforms, the Polish leadership was able resist 
Soviet threats and appoint the moderate Wladyslaw Gomulka as First Secretary. On 
closer inspection however, the Poles had only been able to secure Soviet concessions on 
the condition that they remain loyal to the Kremlin and the Warsaw Pact. The Polish 
“October” did not illustrate further signs of weakness on Khrushchev’s part, as perceived 
by Washington. The much lauded Polish threat of armed resistance to a Russian invasion 
did not ultimately deter Moscow from intervening, as later events in Hungary would 
show, because the Khrushchev delegation was able to secure satisfactory assurances from 
the PZPR that its reforms were consistent with the Kremlin’s own moderate new policies. 
 Washington judged that its new evolutionary policy was influencing events in 
Poland. This was despite it following a self-imposed policy of inaction during the Polish 
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crisis in an effort to avoid provoking Soviet military intervention. On October 21 in a 
televised appearance Secretary Dulles announced that America would not send troops to 
assist Poland even should Moscow intervene by force.13 This echoed the same 
geopolitical impotence that the US had suffered in East Berlin and Poznań. On October 
23 the PPS recommended that the US should “encourage Poland to become increasingly 
independent of the Soviets” but that the imperative was to “avert Soviet forceful 
intervention in Poland, which would not only terminate that independence but might also 
involve a risk of spreading hostilities.” As a result a public posture of self-deference and 
non-involvement should be adopted: 
We should strike a public posture which is restrained and which makes clear 
that while we welcome greater Polish independence we are not seeking to 
gain a position of special influence for ourselves in Poland. 
 
Self-interest formed the basis of this strategy of non-involvement, as Washington’s 
fundamental objective was to avoid embroilment in an expanding conflict. Strategy was 
not necessarily founded on the basis that it provided the best chance of securing Poland’s 
liberation.  
While the US claimed not to be seeking “special influence” in Poland it would 
simultaneously “make known quietly to the Polish regime our willingness to furnish 
economic assistance.”14 Although the ostensible short-term aim of general policy did not 
include the cessation of a satellite’s ties with Moscow or its political, military and 
economic integration into the Western bloc because this was recognised as impossible 
without general war, in the long-term it was exactly the objective. Moscow understood 
that any true concession of Polish independence would only further encourage 
Washington in seeking its long-term aim. Furthermore, should Poland achieve 
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independence, the US would have made progress towards the fundamental long-term goal 
of lifting the Iron Curtain and liberating all the satellites, as a USIA memorandum 
illustrated: “It is in our interest to encourage the present developments in Poland towards 
an increase in Polish self-determination as a step towards weakening the power balance in 
the Soviet bloc.” In contrast to the public announcements, it was still this ultimate aim of 
retracting Soviet dominance that dictated US policies: 
We believe that this can best be done by avoiding giving the Stalinist forces 
in the Soviet Union and in Poland any justification for arguing that the 
present anti-Stalinist developments in Poland are supported by capitalist 
enemies. In our output we should avoid inciting unrest in Poland and in other 
countries of Eastern Europe to such a point as to give the Soviet leaders any 
pretext for using force to subdue national communism in Poland and the other 
satellites.15 
 
US policy was predicated on a public image that concealed its actual objectives, 
reiterating the notion that covert warfare was ‘plausibly deniable.’ This theory continued 
to assume that Moscow would be influenced either way by Washington and would not 
just pursue its own objectives. It also dangerously assumed that the US could exert a 
controlling influence on the satellite populations in order to incite them to or restrain 
them from rebellion at propitious moments as Washington judged. 
 Unrest in the Eastern bloc soon spread to Hungary, where anti-Soviet student 
demonstrations were staged on October 23 in solidarity with the Polish reforms. RFE 
intensively broadcasted “factual” information about the events in Poland throughout the 
satellites because it assessed that spreading the news of Soviet concessions to stir up anti-
Soviet and nationalistic feeling did not cross the line to inciting rebellion. Despite the 
assessment, the result was the same. Violence soon flared up in Budapest as workers and 
students alike began rioting in reaction to the police firing into the crowd of 
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demonstrators. To what extent RFE had contributed to the outbreak is impossible to 
quantify, but the US was certainly implicitly involved because it had spread news of the 
Polish developments in order to induce exactly the kind of demonstrations that initially 
took place in Hungary. The transition of a peaceful demonstration into riots and then 
revolution illustrated the rhetorical fallacy that underlay the administration’s strategy, 
because clearly there was no way to control the indigenous populations and prevent them 
from crossing the line between passive and violent action. 
Washington was in a familiar quandary. The panicked Hungarian leadership 
requested Soviet military intervention to crush what was swiftly becoming an anti-
regime, anti-communist revolution. Moscow hastily fulfilled the request recognising that 
without Soviet troops on the streets of Budapest events would most likely lead to 
Hungary’s declaration of independence and rejection of the Warsaw Pact, eventualities 
unacceptable to the Kremlin. With Washington powerless to exert any influence and, due 
to patchy intelligence unsure of exactly what was happening, Soviet ground forces 
entered the capital during the night of 23-24 October and began to suppress the uprising.  
Meanwhile back in Washington the Eisenhower administration attempted to 
formulate a strategy out of the tatters of its existing policy. The initial assessments should 
not have come as a surprise had the consequences of its policy been thought through. The 
latent anti-Soviet, nationalistic character of the revolt, while simultaneously representing 
a culmination of US psychological and political warfare, confronted Moscow with two 
options. As Allen Dulles observed, the CPSU could either “return to a hard Stalinist 
regime” or “permit developments in the direction of genuine democracy.” Because “the 
revolt in Hungary constituted the most serious threat yet to be posed to continued Soviet 
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control of the satellites” it logically “risked the complete loss of Soviet control.”16 US 
estimates had consistently repeated since NSC 20/4 that the Kremlin would not tolerate 
loss of its hegemony over Eastern Europe, evidently leaving Khrushchev with only one 
option once he had concluded that inaction would result in Hungary’s independence, to 
use force. In any case, that Moscow was confronted with only the two options of 
intervention or genuine democratic reform, as assessed in Washington, illustrated that the 
strategy of fostering national communism was obsolete because it did not offer a realistic 
third alternative.  
Imre Nagy was appointed Prime Minister on the wave of the revolution and 
immediately began the impossible balancing act of appeasing the Hungarian population 
demanding independence and the CPSU which would tolerate only superficial reform and 
certainly no loss of ultimate Soviet control. Unable to accept its impotence, the 
Eisenhower administration debated its strategic ‘options’ ranging from a soft to a hard 
line. In truth, however, once military intervention had been ruled out whatever policy was 
settled on would have proved completely inadequate to influence events to Washington’s 
advantage. Belligerent proposals such as Robert Amory’s of the NSC Planning Board, to 
declare an ultimatum backed up by the threat of a pre-emptive surgical nuclear strike 
along the Red Army’s supply routes were immediately rejected by Eisenhower and 
Dulles.17 The administration was absolutely unwilling to fire the opening salvo of a 
nuclear war over Hungary’s independence.  
Unsurprisingly, C D Jackson also clamoured for an assertive US response to the 
crisis. He was desperately disappointed when the unfolding Suez crisis took precedence 
over Hungary: 
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The Middle East is our weak flank; Eastern Europe is the Soviet weak 
flank; and if we concentrate all our efforts on our own weak flank and do not 
exert any simultaneous pressure on theirs, we have in effect been sucked in to 
playing their game on their field in accordance with their timing. 
 
Although Jackson’s analysis was inaccurate because it implied that the Soviets had 
instigated both crises to manipulate them to its advantage, it did illustrate that beyond the 
rhetorical swagger of “massive retaliation” the US was not committed to a policy of 
“asymmetrical response.”18 All offensive proposals were immediately dismissed by 
Eisenhower and Dulles because they accepted that, in practise, without the commitment 
to fight for Hungary’s sovereignty their hands were tied. It was very difficult for political 
warfare agents to recognise this fact, because their entire energy had been dedicated to 
preparing for this opportunity, but the claim that “a case can be made that [the CIA could 
have intervened] without involving the United States in a world war with the Soviet 
Union” is mistaken.19 It was for exactly this reason that the US did not even consider 
getting involved. 
An alternative conciliatory approach was put forward by Harold Stassen. He 
suggested that Eisenhower indicate to the Soviet leadership that “we are willing to have 
Hungary be established on the Austrian basis- and not affiliated with NATO.”20 
However, this proposal to render Hungary politically neutral and militarily non-aligned as 
on the Austrian model, would have represented a unilateral concession inconsistent with 
its vital interests if accepted by Moscow. Khrushchev had willingly negotiated a treaty 
with the West granting Austrian neutrality because it had represented a compromise 
between the two blocs that furthered the interests of both superpowers.21 A similar 
agreement over Hungary would have conflicted with the maximum concession of 
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extremely moderate reform along the Gomulka line that Moscow was willing to tolerate 
in one of its satellites.  
In any case, Foster Dulles criticised Stassen’s proposal, but not because he 
recognised that it was inherently doomed to failure. Rather, Dulles continued to entertain 
the misguided hope that the US could glean even greater concessions from the Kremlin 
beyond Hungary’s neutrality, and that Stassen’s proposal would in fact represent an 
American concession. The Secretary of State’s scepticism stemmed from his continuing 
desire to see Soviet power rolled back from Eastern Europe and he therefore 
(mis)interpreted events as signalling the initiation of such a retraction. Subsequently the 
speech he gave in Dallas on October 27 embodied a far less concessionary proposal to the 
Soviets than the one originally suggested by Stassen. Dulles condensed the entire 
initiative into the one notorious sentence “[w]e do not look upon these nations as 
potential military allies.”22 
The day after Dulles’s speech Nagy announced a cease-fire and the opening of 
talks with the Soviet leadership. Eisenhower promptly informed Bohlen, now US 
Ambassador to Moscow, to ensure that the Kremlin leadership be made aware of Dulles’s 
comments in the hope that they would sufficiently reassure the Soviets that their security 
needs did not require them to impose military control over Hungary. This done, 
Eisenhower then reiterated the message himself “to remove any false fears that we would 
look upon new governments in these Eastern European countries as potential military 
allies” on October 31.23 Unfortunately, this ‘reassurance’ was wholly inadequate in 
meeting Moscow’s fundamental conditions in a country it considered to be of primary 
geopolitical-strategic importance. In any event, because of America’s persistent overt and 
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covert commitment to the liberation of Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership simply did 
not believe Eisenhower and Dulles and correctly assumed that over the long-term, the US 
would seek the military as well as political-economic integration of these countries.24  
Negotiations between the Hungarian and Soviet authorities continued ostensibly 
until the second Soviet invasion in the early hours of November 4, though they had 
essentially ended when the Soviet decision to invade Hungary had been reached by 
October 31. The actions and strategies adopted by the Eisenhower administration played 
no significant role in influencing Soviet measures during the crisis or the final CPSU 
Presidium’s decision to intervene decisively a second time. Despite its immense global 
power and ideological ambition, without committing military forces on the side of the 
Hungarian revolutionaries, Washington was utterly impotent. It could therefore in no way 
affect the Soviet commitment to a second invasion that came about following Nagy’s 
publicly declared acceptance of the revolution’s demands reflecting Hungary’s rejection 
of Moscow’s political and military authority.25  
 During the lull in fighting the NSC drew up a draft policy as a result of the events 
in Poland and Hungary. NSC 5616 of October 31 continued to endorse “the emergence of 
“‘national’ communist governments” as a “first step towards full national independence 
and freedom.” The pending second Soviet invasion had not yet clarified for Washington 
that the Kremlin would not tolerate the former if it threatened to lead to the latter. Yet this 
objective was retained because of the Polish experience: 
Moscow is apparently willing to accept, however reluctantly, a communist 
government, which, while remaining loyal to its military and political alliance 
with the USSR, asserts its “national independence” and its right to pursue its 
own internal road to communism. 
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US policy still assumed therefore, that even if “national communist” governments could 
successfully hold power without incurring Soviet intervention, they would then be 
amenable to the West and would eventually reform into non-communist governments. 
This process of transition from one bloc to the other seemed to ignore any role that either 
the satellite regime or Moscow might play in obstructing the shift. It should have been 
considered highly unlikely that the Kremlin would tolerate Poland’s drawing closer to the 
West at any time during the foreseeable future, whether or not concessions of internal 
autonomy had been granted to the Gomulka leadership. Instead Washington wrongly 
interpreted the Polish developments as correlating with US national communist strategy 
whereby Gomulka would eventually accede to a democratic government.  
 The final significant policy guideline substantiated by NSC 5616 was to mobilise 
global psychological operations in an attempt to take maximum advantage of Soviet 
brutality.26 The US believed it salient to intensify the current psychological warfare 
campaign in order to keep instability “at boiling point” despite the grave indications that 
this might well influence events towards a tragic conclusion. It also reflected the pre-
eminence the Eisenhower administration gave to words over actions. Both NSC 5616 and 
5616/2, drafted on November 19 (once the revolution had been crushed), gave highest 
priority to the propaganda value of the satellite revolts by making it their first policy 
recommendation.27 Reflecting an inability to translate words into deeds, emphasis was 
put on exploiting the global psychological impact of the rebellions over studies 
promoting Soviet troop withdrawals from the bloc and US action in the event of future 
uprisings.  
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A propaganda offensive denoted the culmination of debate at the highest levels of 
government during the crisis, in which the administration had wrestled with how best to 
damage the Soviet Union’s image in the Developing World. When Eisenhower learned of 
“moving pictures [that] had been taken of Soviet tanks killing Hungarians in the streets of 
Budapest” he “immediately asked whether such movies should not immediately be 
disseminated through our embassies all over the world.” Despite the crudeness of the 
suggestion it was already, in fact, being done.28 Eisenhower and Nixon were most keen to 
influence Indian and Indonesian opinion because these were two of the most powerful 
non-aligned nations. Washington was therefore determined to prevent them succumbing 
to Moscow’s “peace offensive.” In another conversation illustrating their frustration with 
recalcitrant global opinion, Eisenhower suggested that “it might be well for him to write 
to [Jawaharlal] Nehru, bringing out that we are witnessing colonialism by the bayonet in 
Hungary.” Nixon replied that “if Nehru would line up with us in this matter, Russia 
would be ruined in Asia.”29 However, these debates over the manipulation of events in 
order to tarnish Moscow’s international image evaded both America’s role in the violence 
and the global perception of that role which would concomitantly blemish Washington’s 
reputation with Moscow’s. 
A further distraction for the administration was the joint British, French and 
Israeli assault on Egypt. However, the Suez crisis in no way influenced US action 
concerning Hungary because a policy of non-intervention had consistently been upheld at 
least since the East German riots, and was illustrated again by Poznań and the “Polish 
October.” Furthermore, by the time of the British-French invasion on October 31 the 
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administration had privately and publicly dismissed any US military intervention in 
Hungary, regardless of Moscow’s actions. 
Suez undoubtedly distracted Washington though. Such was the geopolitical 
importance the US attached to the region and the fact that the US was the pre-eminent 
power in the Middle East. America therefore had strategic influence over the Suez crisis 
that it lacked in Eastern Europe, and its close allies were also involved in the conflict. As 
a consequence, Eisenhower informed the NSC meeting on November 1 that he “did not 
wish the Council to take up the situation in the Soviet satellites. Instead, he wished to 
concentrate on the Middle East.”30 Although the US was impotent to influence events, 
during the crucial period before the second Soviet invasion three days later Washington 
was totally absorbed by Suez. Instead the administration adopted its familiar wait-and-see 
approach to Hungary, thus failing to bring pressure on the Soviets at the UN, for instance. 
British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, though obviously following his own agenda, 
bemoaned US procrastination and the resultant failure of the West to seek UN mediation 
of the Hungarian crisis:  
Five days passed without any further council meeting upon Hungary despite 
repeated attempts by ourselves and others to bring one about. The United 
States representative was reluctant and voiced his suspicion that we were 
urging the Hungarian situation to direct attention from Suez. The United 
States Government appeared in no hurry to move. Their attitude provided a 
damaging contrast to the alacrity they were showing in arranging the French 
and ourselves!31 
 
US caution perversely resulted in its effectively ignoring Nagy’s repudiation of the 
Warsaw Pact and declaration of Hungarian neutrality despite these actions conforming to 
Washington’s policy objectives. Nagy’s plea to the UN on November 1 to urgently 
consider “the defence of [Hungary’s] neutrality by the four Great Powers” fell on deaf 
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ears.32 Washington was concentrating on Suez and following a self-imposed cautious 
policy towards the Hungarian situation produced by its negligible influence in Eastern 
Europe. To have recognised Hungary’s neutrality would have engaged Washington with 
Moscow’s prestige before the Soviet response was known. The decision to effectively 
ignore Nagy was based on the premise that Moscow might take Hungary by force and 
Washington must not be obliged to defend its sovereignty. The status of neutrality that 
Nagy’s Government urgently required to survive therefore had to be ignored. 
 On November 4, following the Red Army’s launching of “Operation Whirlwind,” 
another proposal for a firmer policy was suggested “even at this late hour” to impose 
political sanctions on the USSR should the invasion continue unabated.33 Instead 
Eisenhower resigned himself to privately appealing to Bulganin to desist in military 
action, blaming the British and French for the strategic quandary he was in, and making 
public statements to the American public that attempted to conceal the administration’s 
impotence:  
I met today with the Secretary of State […], the Director of Central 
Intelligence Agency, and some of my staff to discuss the ways and means 
available to the United States which would result in: 
1. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. 
2. Achieve for Hungary its own right of self-determination in the choice of its 
own government.34 
 
Unfortunately, as Bulganin’s reply bluntly reminded him, geopolitically Hungary was 
effectively “none of the business of the United States.”35 But this was election week for 
the administration and such powerlessness and inadequacy of policy would not likely 
impress the electorate. With great irony considering the timing of the crisis and the 1952 
Republican campaign platform, the anxious presidential candidate Eisenhower informed 
the American public that the crises in Hungary and the Middle East “have no connection 
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whatsoever with matters of partisanship.”36 The truth of the matter was quite the 
opposite; the revolution highlighted the flaws in a flagship strategy of the 1952 campaign 
that the administration had then perpetuated since its election. This was apparently 
missed by the American public on election-day when they overwhelmingly re-elected 
Eisenhower back into the White House.   
 Once the revolt had run its inevitably bloody course with the Soviet suppression 
and re-imposition of authority over Hungary the administration was left to dwell on its 
involvement in the affair. Eisenhower conducted some soul-searching over his 
government’s role in inciting and betraying the rebellion, expressing his “feeling that we 
have excited Hungarians for all these years, and [are] now turning our backs on them 
when they are in a jam.” Dulles consoled him with the same rhetorical excuse that had 
papered over the cracks of the flawed strategy: “we have always been against violent 
revolution.” Eisenhower replied that ‘amazingly’ US representative to the UN Henry 
Cabot Lodge “was in ignorance of this fact.”37 If a high official in the US government 
had failed to comprehend the subtleties of a complex rhetorical strategy, the 
administration could not really expect the frustrated populations of Eastern Europe to 
grasp them. By December at least, there was a certain realisation that “the Hungarians for 
the most part did interpret our broadcasts in a manner probably never intended or 
foreseen.”38  
 Governmental responses to the revolution were varied though. C D Jackson 
acknowledged an administrative sense of contrition to Secretary Dulles, though he still 
clung to the hope of adopting a decisive policy even after the event: 
America has a definite sense of malaise about Hungary, ranging all the way 
from embarrassed self-consciousness to a real guilt complex. America wants 
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action in the case of Hungary, and feels frustrated because it realizes how 
pitifully few are the possible, reasonable, feasible, courses of action.39 
 
Richard Bissell recollected the dilemma posed by the revolution and the reaction to its 
suppression at the CIA:    
Either you give assistance and get bloody results, or you don’t and appear 
weak and mislead your friends. I don’t remember any lucid conversations. I 
remember a lot of hand wringing. No one had thought it through.40 
 
Although this illustrated that, to a certain extent it was recognised that US policy was 
complicit in the outbreak of the unrest, the highest members of the administration 
remained tight-lipped about the affair. For instance Allen Dulles washed his and CIA’s 
hands of the events: 
The chronology and nature of events in Hungary and the statements of the 
Hungarian Government itself prior to its overthrow make it clear that the 
uprising resulted from ten years of Soviet repression and was finally sparked 
by the shooting on 23 October of peaceful demonstrators, and did not result 
from any external influence, such as RFE broadcasts or Free Europe 
leaflets.41 
 
There was some truth in Dulles’s conclusions. The US alone did not cause the 
Hungarians to revolt and were very much a third party to the affair. Years of Soviet 
repression was undoubtedly the root cause of the revolution. But this avoided the 
role that US policy did actually play in influencing popular nationalistic and anti-
Soviet feeling behind the Iron Curtain. The revolt represented the means to an 
objective that had been the lynchpin of US political-psychological warfare strategy 
for the entirety of Eisenhower’s administration and before him Truman’s. Efforts to 
foster indigenous dissatisfaction had in fact been intensified through the 
propaganda channels during the two years leading up to October 1956 because of 
the lack of an alternative strategy to liberate the satellites while avoiding war. The 
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retention of a consistently flawed strategy was testament to the magnitude of 
America’s ideological conviction that liberation must ultimately occur. 
 Several investigations were conducted after the Hungarian tragedy to clarify 
the US role. The broad conclusions reached, that RFE had generally broadcast a 
moderate message during the period of unrest, did not alter the provocative nature 
of “straight news reporting.” The deliberate targeting of the Hungarian population 
following Gomulka’s progress in Poland had been “consistent with policy.”42 The 
US Government finally could not ‘plausibly deny’ its implicit influence of the 
abortive revolution which represented the culmination of a dangerously, even 
recklessly flawed strategy. The Bruce-Lovett report released late in 1956 was 
possibly the most critical of the postscripts: 
The supporters of the 1948 decision to launch this government on a positive 
[psychological and political warfare] program could not possibly have 
foreseen the ramifications of the operations which have resulted from it [….] 
Should not someone, somewhere, in an authoritative position in our 
government, on a continuing basis, be counting the immediate costs of 
disappointments, […] calculating the impacts on our international position, 
and keeping in mind the long range wisdom of activities which have entailed 
our virtual abandonment of the international “golden rule,” and which, if 
successful to the degree claimed for them, are responsible in a great measure 
for stirring up the turmoil and raising the doubts about us that exist in many 
countries of the world today? What of the effects on our present alliances? 
What will happen tomorrow?43  
 
Despite the criticism even this suggested that the administration could somehow have 
evaded its ideological interests and pursued an alternative strategy from the 1948 decision 
to wage political warfare against the Soviet bloc. The fact of the matter, borne out by the 
Hungarian revolution, was that ideology was in fact as integral as geopolitics in the 
formulation and conduct of foreign affairs.  
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CONCLUSION 
The Impact and Significance of the Hungarian Revolution 
on US Strategy and the Historical Record  
The Hungarian revolution marked a symbolic culmination of a decade of US 
efforts to liberate Eastern Europe. The tensions between ideology and geopolitics had 
persistently hampered US strategy while simultaneously sustaining it. The ideological 
drive to project Western democratic and capitalist institutions onto the Eastern European 
theatre was continuously thwarted by the geopolitical limitations that reflected Moscow’s 
superior power position over the US in the region. Oscillating between containment and 
liberation as it was affected by external factors, the US consistently rejected applying the 
requisite military commitment to fulfill its ideological goals in a region of secondary 
geopolitical importance and under the shadow of nuclear war with the USSR. Instead it 
intensified a covert political and psychological warfare campaign behind the Iron Curtain 
that often pursued contradictory objectives and demonstrated a breakdown between 
policy ends and operational means. Driven by ideology but hampered by geopolitics, the 
covert war was never waged on a sufficient scale to succeed in retracting Moscow’s 
power. The fundamental paradox facing Washington was that the scope of political 
warfare required to bring about Eastern Europe’s liberation would have provoked a 
general war with Moscow. Avoiding such a conflict was the lynchpin of American 
foreign policy because it would probably escalate into a nuclear war. Such a development 
bore the prospect of unthinkable destruction not only of the region the US was attempting 
to liberate but also of America itself. 
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The Hungarian revolution marked the symbolic point of acceptance of 
Washington’s foreign policy bureaucracy that its policy was ineffective in achieving 
Eastern Europe’s independence. The impotent “middle road” strategy that had attempted 
to assimilate containment and liberation ultimately paralysed American options. 
Unwilling to go to war with the Soviet Union over Hungary’s independence, the 
Eisenhower administration found itself powerless to influence events in any way. 
Washington was left paradoxically supporting Gomulka’s communist government in 
November 1956, rather than the popular movement in Hungary pressing for democracy 
and independence from the Soviet Union. The revolution that took Imre Nagy as its 
figurehead correlated with America’s fundamental ideological objectives yet Washington 
was powerless to intervene, shackled as it was by geopolitical constraints.  
The historical account of the Hungarian revolution has tended to emphasis the 
apportioning of blame on either the US or the USSR for the events of October and 
November 1956 as well as the influence of the Suez crisis. This has resulted in scholarly 
neglect of the nature of the US strategies that influenced the revolution. Moreover, the 
historical record generally closes the chapter on America’s quest for liberation here, or 
makes vague links between the Hungarian revolution and the revolt in Czechoslovakia in 
1968. Yet the assertion that the events of October and November 1956 irrevocably 
vanquished Washington’s objective of liberation and settled for containment is fallacious. 
Implicit in this contention is that somehow the Hungarian revolution finally produced the 
separation of ideology and geopolitics in American foreign policy. Such a development 
overlooks the intrinsically-bound character of the two forces behind foreign policy. Every 
nation conducts its foreign affairs in a perpetual state of tension and balance between 
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these two elements. The decade leading up to and including the revolt in Budapest 
exposes lucidly that these two forces, being completely fused into the one product of 
foreign policy, can result in even the most powerful nations adopting contradictory and 
ineffectual policies. Even after November 1956 ideologues and activists like C. D. 
Jackson remained committed to the ideal of liberation despite its demonstrated 
infeasibility. An artificial division of ideology and geopolitics by historians creates a 
misreading or reduction of history that neglects the inconsistencies and contradictions 
inherent in all human belief and behaviour.  
In fact the revolution brought about another shift in policy, where the ultimate 
liberation of the satellites was retained as a goal but the means were modified in light of 
internal bureaucratic and popular international pressure. The shift towards more open 
relations with the Eastern European regimes did not represent Washington’s eventual 
recognition of their validity over democratically elected governments but rather a 
modified interim measure to advance the fundamental long-term goal. As a result 
liberation settled into the background, but it did not disappear completely.  
The fact that ideology remained enmeshed with geopolitics was more 
consequential for its influence on US policy in the Developing World. External Soviet 
action had contained liberation in Eastern Europe but Washington now transferred its 
energies to the poorer regions of the globe in an effort to build nations in the image of its 
democratic and capitalist institutions. This matched the ideological projection of Soviet 
values and institutions through Krushchev’s support of “wars of national liberation” as 
the superpowers transferred their efforts from their spheres of influence towards the 
politically-independent non-aligned nations of the world. The tension between ideology 
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and geopolitical interests came to the fore most notably when the US committed itself to 
‘liberate’ Vietnam from communist subversion. In this case the ideological objectives 
were deemed to outweigh the geopolitical-strategic (in)significance of Southeast Asia to 
Washington, resulting in a protracted violent and unnecessary war. The perpetual struggle 
to resolve antagonistic ideological and geopolitical forces continues unabated today. The 
contemporary world witnesses renewed evidence of this tension within American foreign 
policy as it pursues contradictory courses of action and objectives in the Middle East.  
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